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REGULATING PHYSICIAN SPEECH* 
CARL H. COLEMAN** 
Lawmakers have increasingly sought to shape communications 
between physicians and patients by enacting laws that either 
mandate or prohibit the provision or solicitation of particular 
information. Some of these laws can be justified as efforts to 
protect patients by enforcing accepted standards of medical 
practice, but others are grounded in medical positions that are 
the subject of substantial dispute among expert physicians or that 
even flatly contradict an established consensus within the medical 
community. The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear 
legal standard applicable to governmental efforts to control 
physicians’ communications with patients. In the absence of such 
guidance, lower courts have adopted a hodgepodge of 
approaches, none of which is entirely satisfactory. The purpose 
of this Article is to fill this gap by articulating a coherent 
approach to the judicial review of laws regulating physician-
patient communications. This Article rejects the two primary 
approaches that have been proposed in the literature—applying 
strict scrutiny to all laws regulating physician-patient 
communications, on the one hand, or applying varying forms of 
heightened scrutiny (either strict or intermediate) to limited 
categories of communications, on the other. Instead, it proposes 
that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to all laws 
interfering with any aspect of physician-patient communications. 
However, rather than simply looking at any interest asserted by 
the government and then deciding whether it is “important,” 
courts applying intermediate scrutiny should ask whether laws 
interfering with physician speech are reasonably related to the 
specific governmental interest in upholding the quality of 
professional practice. The assessment of whether a law is 
consistent with this standard should generally be decided with 
reference to the views of the professional community; however, 
contrary to other commentators, this Article argues that 
lawmakers should not be required to defer to the professional 
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community’s views in all situations. This Article applies this 
standard to a variety of laws interfering with physician-patient 
communications, concluding that some of them can be justified 
while others cannot. 
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The practice of medicine, at its heart, is a communicative 
endeavor. Many medical interventions are purely communicative, 
ranging from talk therapy for mental illnesses to counseling about 
dietary and lifestyle changes for patients with coronary heart disease. 
Even when physicians prescribe drugs or perform medical 
procedures, they are expected to first engage the patient in a 
conversation to identify symptoms and risk factors, assess available 
treatment options, and determine the appropriate course of care in 
light of the patient’s values and goals.1 A growing body of literature 
recognizes that the manner in which physicians engage in these 
conversations has a significant impact on patient outcomes.2 
Increasingly, lawmakers have sought to shape communications 
between physicians and patients by enacting laws that either mandate 
 
 1. See infra text accompanying notes 77–78. 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 247–50. 
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or prohibit the provision or solicitation of particular information. For 
example, statutes in some states require physicians to inform 
terminally ill patients about the availability of palliative care,3 disclose 
specific information to patients undergoing hysterectomies4 or 
treatment for breast cancer,5 and tell women if mammogram results 
reveal the presence of dense breast tissue.6 More controversially, 
several states have enacted mandatory disclosure laws in the context 
of abortion, some of which require physicians to make highly disputed 
factual assertions, such as a statement that abortion is linked to an 
“increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”7 At the other end of 
the spectrum are laws that prohibit physicians from engaging in 
particular types of communications with patients, including 
prohibitions on recommending the use of medical marijuana,8 making 
routine inquiries about firearm ownership,9 or engaging in talk 
therapy designed to change minors’ sexual orientation.10 
Some of these laws can be justified as efforts to protect patients 
by enforcing accepted standards of medical practice. For example, 
research shows that efforts to change minors’ sexual orientation are 
not only ineffective but also create a risk of psychological harm.11 
 
 3. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §	442.5 (West 2016); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH 
LAW §	2997-c (McKinney 2015).  
 4. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §	2496 (McKinney 2012).  
 5. See Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent 
Statutes, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 201, 211 n.65 (2008) (citing twenty-two state statutes 
requiring physicians to disclose specific breast cancer treatment options). 
 6. See ARE YOU DENSE ADVOCACY, INC., HANDY GUIDE TO STATE DENSITY 
REPORTING LAWS (2018), https://www.areyoudenseadvocacy.org/application/files/3815/
3010/0865/STATE_REPORTING_LAWS_6.26.18FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA6C-W7FM]. 
Other mandatory disclosure laws require physicians to inform pregnant women of the 
drugs expected to be delivered during pregnancy and childbirth, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§	2503 (McKinney 2012), to provide standardized information to patients undergoing 
procedures involving the use of collagen or silicone, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§	2259(a), 
2259.5(a) (West 2012), to disclose specific risks to patients considering electroconvulsive 
treatment, COLO. REV. STAT. §	13-20-401(4)(d) (Lexis through 2018 Legis. Sess.), and to 
provide specific information to individuals undergoing genetic testing, see Kayte Spector-
Bagdady et al., Analysis of State Laws on Informed Consent for Clinical Genetic Testing in 
the Era of Genomic Sequencing, 178 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 81, 83–84 (2018) (reviewing 
state statutes).  
 7. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 686 F.3d 889, 894 
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 8. See infra text accompanying note 79. 
 9. See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 94–102. 
 11. See generally AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC 
RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/
therapeutic-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q6K-SYEK] (concluding that efforts to 
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Laws banning this practice are arguably comparable to prohibitions 
on the use of dangerous and ineffective drugs. Other laws, however, 
are grounded in medical positions that are the subject of substantial 
dispute among expert physicians12 or that even flatly contradict an 
established consensus within the medical community.13 
The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear legal standard 
applicable to governmental efforts to control physicians’ 
communications with patients. In the absence of such guidance, lower 
courts have adopted a hodgepodge of approaches, none of which is 
entirely satisfactory. Some courts have suggested that, in light of the 
government’s role in regulating the medical profession, physicians’ 
communications with their patients are entitled to no First 
Amendment protection.14 Others have subjected restrictions on 
physicians’ speech to heightened First Amendment scrutiny but with 
inconsistent rationales and disparate outcomes.15 Among both courts 
and commentators, there remains substantial disagreement over not 
only the standard to apply in these cases but also the types of state 
interests that legitimately can be taken into account. 
The purpose of this Article is to articulate a coherent approach 
to judicial review of laws regulating physicians’ communications with 
their patients. Part I examines existing case law concerning 
regulations of physician-patient communications, demonstrating that 
the Supreme Court’s approach to the issue remains unsettled and that 
lower courts have applied inconsistent theories with irreconcilable 
results. Part II considers the appropriate standard of review to apply 
in these cases. It rejects the two primary approaches that have been 
proposed in the literature—applying strict scrutiny to all laws 
regulating physician-patient communications, on the one hand, or 
applying varying forms of heightened scrutiny (either strict or 
intermediate) to limited categories of communications, on the other. 
Instead, it proposes that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to all 
 
change sexual orientation are unlikely to be successful and involve some risk of 
psychological harm). 
 12. For example, physicians disagree about the appropriateness of recommending 
marijuana as a therapeutic option. See, e.g., Elin Kondrad & Alfred Reid, Colorado 
Family Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Medical Marijuana, 26 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 52, 
53–55 (2013). 
 13. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (noting medical professionals’ support 
for routinely asking patients whether they have firearms in their homes). 
 14. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233 (1985) (White, J., concurring); 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1226 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated on reh’g, 
797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).  
 15. See infra Section II.B.  
97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019) 
2019] REGULATING PHYSICIAN SPEECH  847 
laws interfering with any aspect of physician-patient communications. 
Part III provides greater detail on how intermediate scrutiny should 
be applied in physician speech cases. It argues that, rather than simply 
looking at any interest asserted by the government and then deciding 
whether it is “important,” courts applying intermediate scrutiny 
should ask whether laws interfering with physician speech are 
substantially related to the specific governmental interest in 
upholding the quality of professional practice. It further argues that 
courts should assess whether a law is consistent with this standard 
with reference to the views of the professional community. Contrary 
to other commentators, however, it argues that lawmakers should not 
be required to defer to the professional community’s views in all 
situations. Part III ends by applying this standard to a variety of laws 
interfering with physician-patient communications, concluding that 
some of them can be justified while others cannot. 
I.  EXISTING CASE LAW 
When physicians speak to the public—for example, by giving a 
speech at a conference or writing a letter to the editor of a 
newspaper—there is little dispute that they are entitled to the same 
First Amendment protections afforded any other speaker.16 Likewise, 
courts have rejected the argument that professional advertising is 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.17 Thus, restrictions on 
advertising by physicians are subject to the same standards applicable 
to any other regulations of commercial speech. 
However, there is far less clarity regarding the appropriate 
standard to apply to laws regulating communications within the 
physician-patient relationship. As the following sections demonstrate, 
some decisions suggest that such speech is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny. Others conclude that it is entitled to First 
Amendment protection but disagree about the appropriate standard 
to apply. 
 
 16. See, e.g., Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 952 P.2d 768, 773 
(Colo. App. 1997) (dismissing action for negligent misrepresentation against a dentist who 
recommended the removal of amalgams in a book and television interview, citing the 
dentist’s First Amendment interest in “[t]he expression of opinions upon matters of public 
concern”). 
 17. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 656 (1985) 
(striking down Ohio’s ban on the use of illustrations in attorney advertising). 
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A. Supreme Court Cases 
One of the earliest Supreme Court discussions of the First 
Amendment’s application to professional communications appears in 
Justice White’s concurring opinion in Lowe v. SEC,18 which argued 
that an unregistered investment adviser had a First Amendment right 
to publish nonpersonalized investment advice in a securities 
newsletter.19 In concluding that the adviser’s publication was 
protected speech, Justice White emphasized that the communications 
were not made in the context of a professional-client relationship.20 If 
they had been, he suggested, they would have constituted “the 
practice of a profession” and would not have been entitled to any 
First Amendment protection.21 Arguing that “[t]he power of 
government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the 
practice of a profession entails speech,”22 he concluded that the First 
Amendment is inapplicable to communications made within “the 
personal nexus between the professional and client.”23 “Just as offer 
and acceptance are communications incidental to the regulable 
transaction called a contract,” Justice White wrote, speech within the 
context of a professional relationship is incidental to the regulable 
activity of practicing a profession.24 
Although some lower courts have cited Justice White’s 
observations with approval,25 it is important to remember that his 
opinion did not command a majority of the Court. Moreover, 
although the opinion speaks broadly of the government’s power to 
 
 18. 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
 19. See id. at 211 (White, J., concurring). The majority in Lowe did not reach the First 
Amendment issue because it concluded that the defendant’s activities did not fall under 
the SEC’s jurisdiction. See id. (majority opinion). 
 20. See id. at 236 (White, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 232. As support for this distinction, Justice White cited Justice Jackson’s 
observation in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring), that “the 
state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I do 
not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or 
reject any school of medical thought.” Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring) 
(quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 22. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (White, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. at 232 (arguing that communications are a part of professional practice when 
one “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on 
behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 
2014), vacated on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 
(11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017); 
Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2013), amended on denial of reh’g en banc, 
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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regulate the professions, it is clear from the context that Justice White 
was referring to a specific form of regulation: the power to “restrict 
entry into professions and vocations through licensing schemes.”26 
Specifically, he argued that, in light of the government’s power “to 
ensure that only those who are suitable to fulfill their fiduciary 
responsibilities may engage in the profession,”27 the challenged 
statute was not unconstitutional “[a]s applied to limit entry into the 
profession of providing investment advice tailored to the individual 
needs of each client.”28 Nothing in the opinion suggested that the 
government has the power to regulate the content of professional 
speech without being subject to ordinary First Amendment 
constraints. 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions support the view that the 
First Amendment applies to content-based restrictions on 
professionals’ communications. One example is Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nevada,29 in which the Court found that the First Amendment did not 
preclude states from disciplining attorneys for making extrajudicial 
statements that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will 
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding.30 In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that 
“the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be 
regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for 
regulation of the press,” but it did not suggest that restrictions on 
professional speech are entirely exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny.31 Four years later, in Florida Bar v. Went for It,32 the Court 
cited Gentile for the proposition that “[t]here are circumstances in 
which we will accord speech by attorneys on .	.	. matters of legal 
representation the strongest protection our Constitution has to 
 
 26. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 229 (White, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 230. 
 28. Id. at 233. But see Paul Sherman, Commentary, Occupational Speech and the First 
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 199 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/vol128_Sherman.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR5R-DX2G] (arguing 
that exempting licensing requirements from First Amendment scrutiny “is hard to square 
with the Supreme Court’s long-held view that licensing laws are among the most onerous 
burdens that can be imposed on speech”); Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the 
First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 106 (2016) (“Even the threshold decision to 
require a license is not immune from high levels of First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 29. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 30. Id. at 1058. 
 31. Id. at 1074. 
 32. 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a thirty-day restriction on targeted direct-mail 
solicitation of accident victims and their relatives as valid regulation of commercial 
speech). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019) 
850 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
offer.”33 However, neither of these cases involved efforts to regulate 
private conversations between professionals and their clients. 
Only two Supreme Court cases have directly addressed the 
constitutionality of laws regulating communications by physicians 
with their patients. The first, Rust v. Sullivan,34 was a challenge to 
federal regulations prohibiting physicians in federally funded family 
planning facilities from counseling patients on abortion. In a 5-4 
decision, the Court upheld the regulations on the ground that the 
government is free to limit the scope of services provided by federally 
funded programs and to require program participants not to offer 
services that go beyond that scope.35 The Court also emphasized that 
the regulations did not “require[] a doctor to represent as his own any 
opinion that he does not in fact hold” and that the relationship 
between physicians and patients in the program was not “sufficiently 
all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the 
patient of comprehensive medical advice.”36 However, while these 
observations would seem to imply that at least some restrictions on 
physician-patient communications could be vulnerable to a First 
Amendment challenge, the Court expressly left that question 
unresolved.37 Moreover, because the case involved conditions placed 
on participants in federally funded programs, it says little about the 
standard applicable to restrictions on physician speech in private 
physician-patient relationships. 
Of greater relevance is the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.38 That 
case involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania law that, among other 
things, required physicians performing abortions to provide specific 
information about the risks of the procedure, the risks of carrying the 
fetus to term, the probable gestational age of the fetus, alternatives to 
abortion, and the fact that the father might be responsible for child 
support payments.39 In addition to finding that these requirements did 
 
 33. Id. at 634. 
 34. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 35. Id. at 193–94. 
 36. Id. at 200. 
 37. Id. (“It could be argued .	.	. that traditional relationships such as that between 
doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government 
regulation, even when subsidized by the Government. We need not resolve that question 
here .	.	.	.”). 
 38. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 39. Id. at 881. 
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not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,40 
a plurality of the Court found that the mandatory disclosures did not 
violate physicians’ First Amendment rights.41 According to the 
plurality, even though the disclosure requirements implicated “the 
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak,” they did so “only 
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State.”42 
The Casey plurality’s terse discussion of the First Amendment 
leaves a great deal open to interpretation. The two cases it cited as 
support—Wooley v. Maynard43 and Whalen v. Roe44—are at best only 
obliquely related to mandated disclosures by physicians to patients. 
Wooley struck down a New Hampshire law requiring drivers to 
display the motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates,45 and 
Whalen upheld a New York statute requiring physicians to report 
prescriptions for controlled substances to public health authorities.46 
Neither of these cases involved governmental intrusions into 
physician-patient discussions. Moreover, as Robert Post has observed, 
“Exactly how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are 
meant to qualify the broad police power discretion of Whalen [was] 
left entirely obscure.”47 
At a minimum, the plurality’s reference to “the physician’s First 
Amendment rights not to speak” affirms that physicians’ 
communications with their patients are entitled to at least some First 
Amendment protection. However, the plurality never articulated the 
applicable standard of review.48 On the one hand, its use of the word 
“reasonable” might mean that such laws are permissible as long as 
they have a rational basis, given that the word “reasonable” is often 
used as a synonym for “rational.”49 On the other hand, the plurality 
 
 40. The plurality concluded that the requirements did not violate the Due Process 
Clause because they did not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to determine 
whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term. See id. at 881–83. 
 41. Id. at 884. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 44. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 45. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713. 
 46. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04. 
 47. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946. 
 48. See Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive 
Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 24 (2015) (observing that Casey “left 
ambiguous how to evaluate regulations of professional speech in health care”). 
 49. See Scott W. Gaylord, A Matter of Context: Casey and the Constitutionality of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 35, 36 (2015) (“[I]n the context of 
the practice of medicine, compelled disclosures generally do not impose an undue burden 
97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019) 
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made this statement only after having already determined (in the 
context of its due process analysis) that the state had a “substantial” 
interest in requiring the disclosures50 and noting “the ways in which 
the speech requirement was narrowly drawn.”51 In light of these 
findings, the Pennsylvania law would have survived even the higher 
standard of intermediate scrutiny,52 making it unnecessary for the 
plurality to decide which of the two standards it was required to 
apply. The most that can be said about Casey is that the plurality was 
clearly not applying strict scrutiny in its First Amendment analysis, as 
it made no effort to determine whether the statute was “narrowly 
tailored” or based on a “compelling state interest.” 
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in National Institute of 
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),53 while not directly 
dealing with communications within a physician-patient relationship, 
sheds light on the Court’s current thinking on the First Amendment’s 
application to professional speech more generally. NIFLA involved a 
challenge to a California statute regulating so-called crisis pregnancy 
centers (“CPCs”), which are organizations that offer a limited range 
of pregnancy-related services and exist primarily to “discourage and 
prevent women from seeking abortions.”54 The California statute 
required licensed CPCs to notify women that the state provides free 
and low-cost pregnancy-related services, including abortions, and 
required unlicensed facilities to notify women that the facilities are 
not licensed to provide medical services.55 A group of CPCs 
challenged the statute under the First Amendment and moved for a 
 
and, consequently, are subject only to ‘reasonableness’ or rational basis review under 
Casey.”); B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 432 (2018) 
(“The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment of the claim, 
suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech 
claim.”). 
 50. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 51. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey “was limited 
to ‘truthful and not misleading’ information” and did “‘not prevent the physician from 
exercising his or her medical judgment’ not to provide the information in certain 
situations” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 884)), vacated on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 
2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en 
banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 52. See id. (“This analysis mirrors an intermediate scrutiny analysis and shows that the 
law in question passes constitutional muster under that standard.”). 
 53. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 54. Id. at 2368. 
 55. Id. at 2368–70. 
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preliminary injunction to prevent the statute from being enforced.56 
The district court denied the motion, finding that the CPCs could not 
show a likelihood of success on the merits.57 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.58 According to the Ninth Circuit, the notice requirement for 
licensed facilities satisfied the “lower level of scrutiny” applicable to 
regulations of “professional speech,” while the notice requirement for 
unlicensed clinics satisfied “any level of scrutiny.”59 In a 5-4 decision, 
the Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court began its analysis by stating that most content-based 
restrictions on speech are “presumptively unconstitutional” and will 
be upheld only if they are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.”60 It criticized the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that content-
based regulations of professional speech are subject to a lower level 
of scrutiny, observing that “this Court has not recognized 
‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”61 At the same 
time, the Court did “not foreclose the possibility” that professional 
speech might constitute “a unique category that is exempt from 
ordinary First Amendment principles,”62 as it found that the statute 
would be unconstitutional even if strict scrutiny were not applied. It 
characterized the notice requirement for licensed facilities as “wildly 
underinclusive,” on the grounds that the state’s interest in providing 
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services 
applied equally to health centers not covered by the statute.63 It also 
found that the state could have achieved its goal of informing women 
about the availability of state-sponsored services through less-
 
 56. Id. at 2370. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 835, 
837, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)). 
 60. Id. at 2371 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)). 
 61. See id. The Court emphasized that “[s]peech is not unprotected merely because it 
is uttered by ‘professionals.’” Id. at 2371–72. This was an odd claim for two reasons. First, 
the Ninth Circuit had not held that professional speech is “unprotected”; it simply found 
that such speech is subject to intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. See Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). Second, proponents of 
a professional speech doctrine have been clear to emphasize that the doctrine does not 
apply to all speech “uttered by ‘professionals’” but rather to the more limited category of 
communications within a professional-client relationship. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, 
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social 
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999) (distinguishing between speech “uttered in 
the course of professional practice” and speech “uttered by a professional”). 
 62. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 63. Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)). 
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restrictive means, such as public information campaigns.64 The Court 
expressed the same concerns about underinclusiveness with respect to 
the notice requirement for unlicensed facilities.65 In addition, it 
concluded that the justification for that requirement was “purely 
hypothetical,” as there was no evidence that women did not already 
know that these clinics were unlicensed.66 
NIFLA’s implications for laws governing physician-patient 
communications are difficult to determine. In addition to leaving 
open the possibility that the regulation of professional speech might 
not be subject to ordinary First Amendment principles, the Court 
noted that, even if strict scrutiny does apply to professional speech, 
“[s]tates may regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct 
incidentally involves speech.”67 The Court cited Casey as support for 
this proposition, implying that informed consent discussions fall into 
the category of “professional conduct” that has an incidental effect on 
speech.68 It further suggested that this exception to strict scrutiny 
might go beyond informed consent to include other regulations of 
professional speech “tied to a [medical] procedure.”69 The reason this 
exception did not apply to the California statute in NIFLA was that 
the law regulated facilities rather than physicians, and it applied 
“regardless of whether a medical procedure is ever sought, offered, or 
performed.”70 However, depending on how the Court applies this 
speech/conduct distinction in future cases, it is possible that, even if 
most content-based regulations of professional speech are governed 
by strict scrutiny, laws governing physician-patient communications 
will remain subject to a more deferential standard of review. 
B. Lower Court Cases 
The scant Supreme Court case law on point has left lower courts 
with little guidance in cases involving restrictions on professional 
communications. The one issue on which there appears to be a 
consensus is that laws requiring licensing of individuals who engage in 
speech-related professions do not violate the First Amendment rights 
 
 64. Id. at 2376. 
 65. See id. at 2378. 
 66. Id. at 2377 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of 
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)). 
 67. Id. at 2372. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 2373. 
 70. Id. 
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of nonlicensed persons.71 For example, circuit courts have rejected 
First Amendment challenges to laws requiring licensing of 
psychotherapists,72 interior designers,73 fortune tellers,74 and 
accountants.75 None of these cases, however, directly addressed 
efforts to regulate the content of communications between 
professionals and their clients.76 On that question, lower courts have 
adopted a broad range of approaches, reflecting dramatically 
different understandings of the First Amendment issues at stake. This 
section considers those cases, focusing on those specifically related to 
the medical profession. 
1.  Physician Speech Recommending Therapeutic Options 
A core function of physician speech is to ensure that patients 
have information about the range of therapeutic options available in 
their particular circumstances. This responsibility is reflected in the 
doctrine of informed consent, which requires that physicians not only 
present the risks and benefits of proposed treatments but also discuss 
available alternatives that fall within the prevailing standard of care.77 
 
 71. The D.C. Circuit, however, has held that the lower level of First Amendment 
protection for licensing requirements is limited to occupations involving individualized 
professional-client relationships. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1000 
& n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to a regulation requiring tour guides 
to pass a licensing exam on the ground that tour guides “provide virtually identical 
information to each customer”). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that states may not 
use their licensing authority to restrict persons from using professional titles outside the 
context of professional practice. See Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 
2016) (finding that Texas could not prohibit an unlicensed political candidate from 
describing herself as a psychologist on her campaign website, noting that “[o]utside the 
fiduciary relationship between client and therapist, speech is granted ordinary First 
Amendment protection”). 
 72. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 
228 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 73. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 74. See Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 570 (4th Cir. 2013). To 
the extent the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in NIFLA casts doubt on the idea that 
professional speech is a distinct First Amendment category, the continued precedential 
value of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Moore-King remains uncertain. See NIFLA, 138 
S. Ct. at 2375 (questioning whether there is “a persuasive reason for treating professional 
speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles,” 
but not “foreclos[ing] the possibility that some such reason exists”). 
 75. See Accountant’s Soc’y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 76. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1055–56 
(noting that the law requiring licenses for psychotherapists did not “dictate the content of 
what is said in therapy”). 
 77. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries 
of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 829–32 [hereinafter Sawicki, Modernizing 
Informed Consent] (describing the common law foundations of informed consent). 
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In addition to being a legal duty, presenting patients with alternatives 
to proposed treatments is considered part of physicians’ ethical 
obligation to respect patients’ decision-making autonomy.78 
Within this context, many physicians strongly objected when, in 
response to state laws immunizing physicians from prosecution for 
recommending marijuana for medical purposes, the federal 
government declared that physicians who made such 
recommendations would risk losing their federal licenses to prescribe 
controlled substances.79 In Conant v. Walters,80 a coalition of 
physicians and patients brought suit to enjoin enforcement of this 
policy on First Amendment grounds.81 A district court found for the 
plaintiffs, and the government appealed.82 
In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the 
government’s threat to revoke the controlled substance registrations 
of physicians who recommend medical marijuana undermined “core 
First Amendment interests of doctors and patients.”83 Unlike 
licensing laws, which are content-neutral standards for judging 
individuals’ qualifications for entry into a profession, penalizing 
physicians for recommending medical marijuana “seeks to punish 
physicians on the basis of the content of doctor-patient 
communications.”84 The court noted that, in a previous case 
upholding licensing requirements for mental health professionals, it 
had emphasized that the law did not seek to control the content of 
therapists’ communications with patients or to prevent therapists 
from relying on particular psychoanalytic techniques.85 Here, 
however, the law directly regulated the content of what physicians 
could say to their patients. 
The court was particularly troubled by the fact that the 
challenged policy intruded on the normal process of professional 
decision-making. It contrasted the blanket policy against 
recommending medical marijuana with the Pennsylvania law that had 
been upheld in Casey, which excused physicians from making the 
required disclosures if they had a reasonable belief that doing so 
would have a “severely adverse effect on the physical or mental 
 
 78. See id. at 827–29 (discussing the ethical foundations of informed consent). 
 79. See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California 
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164–66 (Feb. 11, 1997). 
 80. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 81. Id. at 632. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 636. 
 84. Id. at 637. 
 85. Id. 
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health of the patient.”86 In light of this exception, the court observed 
that the Pennsylvania law “did not ‘prevent the physician from 
exercising his or her medical judgment.’”87 
The Ninth Circuit also compared the case to Legal Services Corp. 
v. Velazquez,88 in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute 
preventing legal service organizations receiving federal funds from 
challenging welfare laws.89 “Like the limitation in Velazquez,” the 
court found that the prohibition on recommending medical marijuana 
“‘alter[s] the traditional role’ of medical professionals by 
‘prohibit[ing] speech necessary to the proper functioning of those 
systems.’”90 The court’s reliance on Velazquez suggests that the 
problem with the federal policy was not simply that it interfered with 
the rights of individual physicians and patients but also that it 
undermined physicians’ ability to conform to the medical profession’s 
own standards and norms. 
2.  Physician Speech with Therapeutic Purposes 
While many medical treatments involve drugs or procedures, in 
other situations physicians treat patients with nothing more than 
words. An obvious example is when psychiatrists engage in talk 
therapy with their patients, a process in which the treatment consists 
entirely of conversation. Other examples include advising patients on 
improving cardiac health through diet or exercise,91 and counseling 
patients about nonpharmaceutical strategies for dealing with 
symptoms such as insomnia or pain.92 As discussed further below, it 
can sometimes be difficult to differentiate between speech that 
 
 86. Id. at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883–84 
(1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 87. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84). 
 88. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 89. Id. at 536–37. 
 90. Conant, 309 F.3d at 638 (alterations in original) (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 
544). 
 91. See generally Nancy T. Artinian et al., Interventions to Promote Physical Activity 
and Dietary Lifestyle Changes for Cardiovascular Risk Factor Reduction in Adults, 122 
CIRCULATION 406 (2010) (discussing the role of physician counseling in improving cardiac 
health). 
 92. See generally John McBeth et al., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Exercise, or Both 
for Treating Chronic Widespread Pain, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 48, 48 (2012) 
(concluding that telephone-delivered cognitive behavioral therapy led to “substantial, 
statistically significant, and sustained improvements” in patients’ global assessments of 
their health); Amir Qaseem et al., Management of Chronic Insomnia Disorder in Adults: A 
Clinical Practice Guideline from the American College of Physicians, 165 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 125 (2016) (discussing the importance of behavioral counseling as a first-
line treatment for insomnia). 
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recommends a therapeutic option and speech that constitutes the 
therapy itself.93 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown94 
found that the distinction between these two types of speech had 
constitutional significance. 
Pickup involved a challenge to a California law prohibiting 
licensed mental health care providers from performing therapies 
intended to change minors’ sexual orientation (known as “sexual 
orientation change efforts,” or “SOCE”).95 These therapies included 
techniques such as “assertiveness and affection training with physical 
and social reinforcement” and attempts “to change gay men’s and 
lesbians’ thought patterns by reframing desires, redirecting thoughts, 
or using hypnosis.”96 Providers who violated the statute could be 
subject to professional discipline.97 
In upholding the law, the court distinguished the ban on SOCE 
from the federal policy against recommending medical marijuana, 
which the court had previously found unconstitutional in Conant.98 It 
observed that the policy at issue in Conant involved “doctor-patient 
communications about medical treatment,”99 whereas the ban on 
SOCE targeted a type of medical treatment that just happens to be 
carried out through the mechanism of speech. According to the court, 
because the speech was primarily “therapeutic, not symbolic,” it did 
not constitute “an act of communication” triggering First 
Amendment protection.100 Instead, when “treatment is performed 
through speech alone,” regulation of that speech constitutes a 
regulation of conduct, “subject to deferential review just as are other 
regulations of the practice of medicine.”101 The court emphasized that 
physicians remained free to discuss SOCE with their patients and to 
express opinions about its advantages and drawbacks, as long as they 
did not actually perform the therapy themselves.102 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pickup also clarified—or perhaps 
narrowed—its previous decision in Conant by emphasizing that even 
 
 93. See infra text accompanying notes 247–50. 
 94. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). As with Moore-King, the Supreme Court’s 2018 
decision in NIFLA creates some uncertainty as to the continued precedential value of the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup. See supra note 74. 
 95. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222–23. 
 96. Id. at 1222. 
 97. Id. at 1223. 
 98. Id. at 1219–20. 
 99. Id. at 1227. 
 100. Id. at 1230. 
 101. Id. at 1230–31. 
 102. Id. at 1219. 
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speech about treatment is subject to “somewhat diminished” First 
Amendment protection.103 Citing Justice White’s concurring opinion 
in Lowe, the court observed that, when speech occurs “within the 
confines of a professional relationship,” the purpose is “to advance 
the welfare of the clients, rather than to contribute to public 
debate.”104 It found that a greater degree of regulation is justified 
under these circumstances in light of the government’s interest in 
protecting clients from harm. Whereas Conant was concerned with 
the possibility that restrictions on speech could interfere with 
physicians’ ability to make individualized medical judgments, in 
Pickup, the court emphasized the government’s interest in protecting 
patients from speech “that is not consistent with the accepted 
standard of care.”105 For example, the court observed that the First 
Amendment would not prohibit a state from revoking the license of a 
physician who “counsel[s] a patient to rely on quack medicine.”106 
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup, the Third 
Circuit confronted a similar challenge to a New Jersey law prohibiting 
the use of SOCE with minor patients. In its decision in King v. 
Governor of New Jersey,107 the Third Circuit found that the law was 
constitutional but rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that the law 
should be analyzed as a regulation of conduct rather than a limitation 
on speech.108 The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,109 which rejected the 
government’s effort to characterize a law prohibiting the provision of 
legal advice to terrorist organizations as a limitation on conduct with 
only incidental effects on speech.110 According to the Third Circuit, 
the decision in Humanitarian Law Project “makes clear that verbal or 
written communications, even those that function as vehicles for 
 
 103. Id. at 1228. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). As with Moore-King and Pickup, the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 decision in NIFLA creates some uncertainty as to the continued precedential 
value of the Third Circuit’s decision in King. See supra note 74. 
 108. King, 767 F.3d at 226–29. 
 109. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 110. See id. at 35–36. Despite finding that the statute implicated protected speech, the 
Court upheld it as applied to the kinds of support the plaintiffs sought to provide. See id. 
at 36 (finding that the government had sustained its burden of showing that “it was 
necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form of training, expert advice, 
personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups”). 
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delivering professional services, are ‘speech’ for purposes of the First 
Amendment.”111 
Despite its conclusion that the prohibition on SOCE was a 
regulation of speech and not conduct, the Third Circuit rejected the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to the statute.112 Like the Ninth 
Circuit, the court found that speech within the confines of a 
professional relationship is entitled to only “diminished” First 
Amendment protection.113 The court emphasized that clients typically 
have “no choice but to place their trust in .	.	. professionals,” given 
that professionals have specialized knowledge and training that most 
clients lack.114 According to the court, to adequately protect 
vulnerable clients, states must have sufficient leeway to regulate all 
aspects of professional practice, even if doing so may sometimes 
involve placing limits on speech.115 The court concluded that the 
appropriate standard of review of restrictions on professional speech 
was intermediate scrutiny, under which “prohibitions of professional 
speech are constitutional only if they directly advance the State’s 
interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or ineffective 
professional practices and are no more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest.”116 It found that the prohibition on SOCE satisfied 
this standard, in light of medical testimony that the practice had the 
potential to cause serious harm.117 
3.  Physician Speech to Elicit Information from Patients 
Physicians communicate with patients not only to convey 
information or engage in speech-based forms of treatment but also to 
prompt patients to share information that might be relevant to 
decisions about their care. Such information might include personal 
and family medical histories or details about diet, exercise, and other 
 
 111. King, 767 F.3d at 225–26. 
 112. Id. at 224. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 232. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 233. The Third Circuit suggested that this standard was arguably stricter 
than the plurality’s approach in Casey, but it distinguished Casey on the ground that “the 
regulation it addressed fell within a special category of laws that compel disclosure of 
truthful factual information.” Id. at 235–36 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (plurality opinion)). It concluded that Casey was inapplicable 
because the ban on SOCE was “a prohibition of speech, not a compulsion of truthful 
factual information.” Id. at 236. 
 117. Id. at 238. 
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behaviors.118 In some cases, physicians ask the same questions to 
everyone because they have important health-related implications for 
all classes of patients. In other cases, physicians may tailor their 
questions based on the patient’s age, gender, or preexisting diagnoses. 
In response to evidence of the health risks associated with 
firearm ownership, major medical groups have recommended that, 
along with other routine questions, physicians ask their patients 
whether they have firearms in their homes so that they can counsel 
patients about the importance of storing weapons safely.119 However, 
following complaints by individuals who perceived these questions as 
intrusive, Florida enacted a statute prohibiting physicians from 
inquiring about firearm ownership unless they have made a 
particularized determination that the information is relevant to the 
patient’s medical care or safety, or to the safety of others.120 
 
 118. See Tosha B. Wetterneck et al., Development of a Primary Care Physician Task 
List to Evaluate Clinic Visit Workflow, 21 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 47, 50 (2012) (listing 
twenty-six categories of information physicians are expected to gather from patients 
during a patient encounter).  
 119. See Council on Injury, Violence, & Poison Prevention Exec. Comm., Am. Acad. 
of Pediatrics, Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS 
e1416, e1421 (2012) (“The AAP recommends that pediatricians incorporate questions 
about the presence and availability of firearms into their patient history taking and urge 
parents who possess guns to prevent access to these guns by children.”); Prevention of 
Firearm Accidents in Children H-145.990, AMA, https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/
policyfinder/detail/H-145.990?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-547.xml [https://perma.cc/
4YH3-ZW3C] (last updated 2018) (calling on AMA members to “inquire as to the 
presence of household firearms as a part of childproofing the home”); see also Steven E. 
Weinberger et al., Firearm-Related Injury and Death in the United States: A Call to Action 
from 8 Health Professional Organizations and the American Bar Association, 162 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 513, 514 (2015) (“[P]hysicians must be allowed to speak freely to their 
patients in a nonjudgmental manner about firearms, provide patients with factual 
information about firearms relevant to their health and the health of those around them, 
fully answer their patients’ questions, and advise them on the course of behaviors that 
promote health and safety without fear of liability or penalty.”).  
 120. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§	381.026, 456.072, 790.338 (West 2017 & West Supp. 2019). 
Together, these provisions provide that licensed health care providers and facilities may 
not enter information about a patient’s firearm ownership into a patient’s medical record 
“if the practitioner knows that such information is not relevant to the patient’s medical 
care or safety, or the safety of others,” FLA. STAT. ANN. §	790.338(1) (West 2017); must 
refrain from asking whether a patient or his or her family member owns firearms unless 
the practitioner or facility believes in good faith that the “information is relevant to the 
patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others,” FLA. STAT. ANN. §	381.026(b) 
(West Supp. 2019); and must refrain from discriminating against or harassing patients 
based on firearm ownership, FLA. STAT. ANN. §	790.338(5)–(6) (West 2017). Violation of 
these provisions constitutes ground for professional discipline, including the potential loss 
of a physician’s medical license. FLA. STAT. ANN. §	456.072(u), (nn) (West Supp. 2019).  
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In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,121 a group of physicians 
and advocacy groups challenged the statute as a violation of the First 
Amendment.122 The district court found that the statute was subject to 
heightened scrutiny because it imposed a content-based restriction on 
physicians’ expression.123 It concluded that, regardless of whether the 
statute was analyzed under strict or intermediate scrutiny, the state’s 
interests were insufficient to justify the limitation on speech.124 In 
particular, it found that the State’s reliance on the Second 
Amendment was misplaced, as physicians’ questions about firearm 
ownership do not deprive individuals of their right to keep and bear 
arms,125 and that there was no evidence that the prohibition was 
necessary to protect patients from discrimination or harassment.126 
The court also found that the state’s interest in protecting patients’ 
privacy was not a sufficient basis for upholding the law, given the 
existence of federal and state laws protecting the confidentiality of 
medical records.127 
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court in an 
en banc decision,128 but only after a three-judge panel had issued 
three separate opinions reversing the district court, each of which 
rested on a different rationale. In its first decision, issued in July 
2014,129 the majority of the three-judge panel found that the law was 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny because it regulated conduct 
rather than expression.130 This decision relied on a broad 
interpretation of Justice White’s observation in Lowe that “[t]he 
power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever 
 
 121. 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 122. Id. at 1300–01. 
 123. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1261–62 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 
(11th Cir. 2017). 
 124. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1317. 
 125. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
 126. Id. at 1264–65. 
 127. Id. at 1265. In addition to finding that the law interfered with physicians’ First 
Amendment rights, the district court found that it was unconstitutionally vague because it 
did “not define what constitutes ‘relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety, or the 
safety of others,’” and because “what constitutes ‘unnecessary harassment’ is left to 
anyone’s guess.” Id. at 1268–69. 
 128. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1319. 
 129. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated on 
reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 130. Id. at 1217. 
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the practice of a profession entails speech.”131 Rejecting the argument 
that this statement was limited to licensing requirements, the majority 
concluded that any regulation of a professional’s exercise of judgment 
on behalf of an individual client is entirely exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.132 The majority acknowledged the Ninth 
Circuit’s distinction in Pickup between physician speech “about 
medical treatment” and speech that “was itself treatment,” but it 
found that “the line between treatment and communication about 
treatment is not necessarily so clear.”133 For example, it observed that 
a physician’s effort to help a patient stop smoking might begin with 
asking the patient whether he smokes, followed by a recommendation 
not to continue.134 Likewise, it observed that “[a] physician’s inquiry 
about the presence of firearms in a patient’s home may be viewed as 
the opening salvo in an attempt to treat any issues raised by the 
presence of those firearms.”135 According to the majority, both the 
initial questions and the follow-up they engender are “part and parcel 
with the physician’s treatment of the patient.”136 
The panel’s July 2014 decision provoked a sharp dissent that, 
among other things, criticized the majority for “creating a new 
category of speech immune from First Amendment review.”137 
Perhaps in response to these comments, the panel took the unusual 
step of vacating its decision sua sponte and, in July 2015, substituted a 
new opinion138 in which it concluded that the law was, in fact, a direct 
regulation of speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny.139 
However, the majority found that the regulation of speech within the 
context of professional-client relationships is subject to a “lesser level 
of scrutiny,”140 given the state’s interest in “regulation of the 
profession for the protection of the public, and regulation of the 
 
 131. Id. at 1217–18 (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., 
concurring)). 
 132. Id. at 1222–23 (“We are not convinced that a licensing requirement is the only 
form of professional regulation that may validly touch on professional speech.”). 
 133. Id. at 1224. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1237 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 138. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir.), vacated on reh’g, 814 
F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 
2017). 
 139. See id. at 886 (“[W]hile the discrimination provision is a regulation of professional 
conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech, and thus does not implicate the First 
Amendment, the record-keeping, inquiry, and harassment provisions do regulate a 
significant amount of protected speech.”). 
 140. Id. at 892. 
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[physician-patient] relationship for the protection of the patient and 
the benefit of society.”141 It therefore concluded that the appropriate 
standard of review was intermediate scrutiny.142 
Citing “simple common sense,” the majority found that the 
state’s interests were sufficiently strong to satisfy the intermediate 
scrutiny standard.143 The majority emphasized that the statute did not 
prohibit physicians from inquiring about firearms if they made a good 
faith judgment that doing so was “medically appropriate in the 
circumstances of the particular patient’s case.”144 Thus, it viewed the 
statute as limiting only irrelevant medical inquiries and concluded 
that “[p]roscribing highly intrusive speech that physicians themselves 
do not believe to be relevant or necessary directly advances the 
State’s interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or ineffective 
professional practices and safeguarding their privacy.”145 
A few months later, the panel once again vacated its decision sua 
sponte and substituted yet another opinion.146 The third decision was 
prompted by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert,147 which struck down a municipal law imposing stricter limits 
on signs advertising religious services than on signs displaying 
political or ideological messages.148 Because Justice Thomas’s 
majority decision in Reed suggested that all content-based restrictions 
on speech must be evaluated under strict scrutiny, the panel chose to 
reevaluate the Florida statute using strict, rather than intermediate, 
scrutiny. It concluded that, even if strict scrutiny applied, the Florida 
statute would still be constitutional, as the state’s interest behind the 
law was “compelling” and the law was “narrowly tailored to advance 
that interest.”149 
Given the panel’s own struggles with the proper resolution of this 
case, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to reconsider it en banc did not 
come as a surprise. The en banc court’s ruling largely mirrored the 
district court’s earlier analysis. Emphasizing that the legislature’s 
evidence of harms caused by physician firearm inquiries was limited 
 
 141. Id. at 889. 
 142. Id. at 896. 
 143. Id. at 898. 
 144. Id. at 900. 
 145. Id. at 898. 
 146. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 147. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 148. Id. at 2233. 
 149. Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1186. 
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to “six anecdotes and nothing more,”150 the court found that the state 
had failed to provide evidence that the statute addressed “harms that 
are ‘real, [and] not merely conjectural.’”151 In addition, like the district 
court, the en banc court emphasized that other mechanisms already 
existed to promote the state’s legitimate interest in protecting patient 
privacy.152 
The en banc majority expressly declined to decide whether it was 
necessary to subject the Florida statute to strict scrutiny, as it found 
that the statute failed even the more lenient standard of intermediate 
scrutiny.153 However, Judge Wilson, who had dissented from the 
original panel decisions upholding the statute, wrote separately “to 
underscore the importance of applying the most demanding standard 
of scrutiny to this content-based law.”154 Although he acknowledged 
that “the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the appropriate 
level of protection for professional speech,” he argued that 
“[c]ontent-based restrictions on speech are permitted only when they 
fall within a few historic and traditional categories, such as obscenity 
or defamation,” and that “[a]bsent from any such category of 
unprotected speech is truthful speech by physicians.”155 Distinguishing 
“other professional speech situations in which the state has a valid 
interest in regulating a specialized profession,”156 Judge Wilson 
characterized the Florida statute as a “subversive attempt” to 
“silence[] doctors who advance a viewpoint about firearms with which 
the state disagrees.”157 
4.  Compelled Physician Speech 
In contrast to the cases discussed in the previous sections, which 
involved limitations on what physicians are permitted to say to their 
patients, several decisions in the context of abortion involve laws 
compelling physicians to make specific disclosures. The abortion laws 
are not the only examples of government-mandated disclosure 
requirements,158 but so far they are the only ones that have resulted in 
 
 150. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1312 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 151. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)). 
 152. Id. at 1314. 
 153. Id. at 1311. 
 154. Id. at 1324 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 1325. 
 156. Id. (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051–52 (1991) (discussing 
cases involving “commercial speech by attorneys or restrictions upon release of 
information that the attorney could gain only by use of the court’s discovery process”)). 
 157. Id. at 1324. 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6. 
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First Amendment litigation. The circuit courts have reached 
conflicting opinions on the appropriate standard to apply. 
In two separate en banc decisions in Planned Parenthood 
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds (Rounds I and 
Rounds II),159 the Eighth Circuit interpreted Casey to mean that a 
state “can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to 
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s 
decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also 
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”160 First, in 
its 2008 decision (Rounds I), the court applied this standard to uphold 
South Dakota’s requirement that physicians inform pregnant women 
that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, 
living human being” with whom the woman “has an existing 
relationship.”161 Rejecting the argument that the physicians were 
being forced to transmit the state’s “ideological message,” it found 
that the required disclosure was factually accurate under the statute’s 
own definition of the term “human being,” which included “an 
individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens .	.	. during 
[its] embryonic [or] fetal age[].”162 The court concluded that it was 
“incumbent upon .	.	. a physician answering a patient’s questions” to 
explain that the term “human being” had a particular statutory 
meaning.163 
Four years later, in its decision in Rounds II, the court upheld 
another part of South Dakota’s abortion statute, which required 
 
 159. Rounds II, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Rounds I, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 160. Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 734–35. Although the court did not specify which standard 
of review it was applying, its focus on whether the compelled disclosures were truthful and 
not misleading is similar to the Supreme Court’s approach in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In that case, the Court held that states may 
require an attorney to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the 
terms under which his services will be available” because doing so is “reasonably related 
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Id. at 651. The Zauderer 
standard essentially amounts to a form of rational basis review and represents an 
exception to the standard of intermediate scrutiny that normally applies in commercial 
speech cases. See Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 972 (2017).  
 161. Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 726 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §	34-23A-10.1 (Westlaw 
through 2019 Reg. Sess. effective Mar. 27, 2019)). 
 162. Id. at 735–36 (alterations in original) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §	34-23A-1 
(Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. effective Mar. 27, 2019)). 
 163. Id. at 735–36; see also B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and the Politics of 
Reproductive Health Care, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 103, 113 (2016) (arguing that the 
court considered this information relevant only because it had “fram[ed] abortion as 
predominantly (or at least substantially) a moral decision rather than a medical one,” 
thereby “expand[ing] the concept of ‘relevance’ beyond its traditional boundaries in the 
informed-consent context”).  
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physicians to state that “increased risk of suicide ideation and 
suicide” are “statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant 
woman would be subjected.”164 According to the court, this statement 
was truthful because there was evidence that having an abortion is 
correlated with suicide or suicide ideation—i.e., that the prevalence of 
suicidality is greater among women who have had abortions than 
among women who have not.165 Although it acknowledged that there 
was no medical consensus “as to whether abortion plays a causal role 
in the observed correlation between abortion and suicide,” it found 
that this uncertainty did not make the mandatory disclosure 
misleading.166 To establish that the disclosure was “unconstitutionally 
misleading or irrelevant,” the plaintiffs would have had to prove that 
“abortion has been ruled out, to a degree of scientifically accepted 
certainty, as a statistically significant causal factor in post-abortion 
suicides.”167 In other words, even though some women might interpret 
the disclosure to mean that having an abortion would make it more 
likely that they would become suicidal, and even though such a causal 
relationship had not been established, physicians could still be 
required to make the disclosure because the implied causal 
connection had not been definitively proven to be false. The court 
suggested that, to the extent the required disclosure might be 
confusing, it was the physicians’ job to “explain[] [the information] 
correctly to their patients.”168 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas Medical Providers 
Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey,169 involving a Texas statute 
requiring providers to display and discuss the results of a sonogram 
before performing abortions, relied on a similar approach. According 
to the Fifth Circuit, the state’s authority to regulate the medical 
profession includes the right to require “truthful, nonmisleading, and 
relevant” disclosures, and such requirements do not infringe on 
physicians’ First Amendment right not to speak.170 Like the Eighth 
Circuit in Rounds II, it relied on Casey as support for this proposition, 
describing the plurality’s First Amendment analysis in that case as 
 
 164. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 894. 
 165. Id. at 899 (“[T]he standard medical practice, as reflected in the record, is to 
recognize a strongly correlated adverse outcome as a ‘risk’ while further studies are 
conducted to clarify whether various underlying factors play causal roles.”).  
 166. Id. at 900. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 904–05. 
 169. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 170. Id. at 576. 
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“the antithesis of strict scrutiny.”171 Characterizing the descriptions of 
sonogram results as “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading 
information,”172 the court suggested that withholding the information 
from the woman would be “more of an abuse to her ability to 
decide.”173 
In contrast, in Stuart v. Camnitz,174 the Fourth Circuit took a very 
different approach to the First Amendment implications of compelled 
physician disclosures. Stuart involved a challenge to North Carolina’s 
abortion disclosure requirements, which compelled physicians to 
display and describe the results of a sonogram even if the woman was 
“avert[ing] her eyes from the displayed images” or “refus[ing] to hear 
the simultaneous explanation and medical description.”175 Finding 
that Casey “did not hold sweepingly that all regulation of speech in 
the medical context merely receives rational basis review,” the court 
found that the proper standard for analyzing content-based physician 
disclosure requirements was intermediate scrutiny.176 It found that the 
North Carolina law failed that standard because, even assuming a 
substantial state interest in promoting childbirth, the law did not 
“directly advance the interest without impeding too greatly on 
individual liberty interests or competing state concerns.”177 
The court’s primary objection to the law was that it was 
incompatible with “[t]raditional informed consent requirements,”178 in 
which the physician’s role is “to inform and assist the patient without 
imposing his or her own personal will and values on the patient.”179 
By “[t]ransforming the physician into the mouthpiece of the state,” 
the court argued, the law “undermines the trust that is necessary for 
facilitating healthy doctor-patient relationships.”180 Unlike the Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit did not find it dispositive that 
all of the required disclosures were truthful: “While it is true that the 
words the state puts into the doctor’s mouth are factual, that does not 
divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implications.”181 
 
 171. Id. at 575. 
 172. Id. at 578. 
 173. Id. at 579. 
 174. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).  
 175. Id. at 243. 
 176. Id. at 249. 
 177. Id. at 250. 
 178. Id. at 251. 
 179. Id. at 252. 
 180. Id. at 253. 
 181. Id. at 246. 
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The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart is notable for its reliance 
on professional medical standards. Specifically, it criticized the North 
Carolina law as being “in direct contravention of medical ethics and 
the principle of patient autonomy.”182 While the court recognized the 
state’s role in regulating the medical profession, it asserted that “[t]he 
government’s regulatory interest is less potent in the context of a self-
regulating profession like medicine.”183 Like the Ninth Circuit in 
Conant, the court also suggested that states have an obligation to 
respect physicians’ “capacity for independent medical judgment that 
professional status implies.”184 
II.  DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Among legal commentators, there is broad consensus that at 
least some laws regulating physicians’ communications with their 
patients should be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 
However, commentators disagree about not only the appropriate 
level of scrutiny—strict versus intermediate—but also the types of 
laws to which heightened scrutiny should apply. This part considers 
the two primary approaches to the issue that appear in the literature. 
The first calls on courts to apply strict scrutiny to all laws regulating 
physicians’ communications with their clients. The second argues that 
certain types of laws regulating physician speech should trigger 
heightened scrutiny—in some cases strict, and in others 
intermediate—while others should enjoy no First Amendment 
protection at all. After examining the practical and theoretical 
problems with both of these approaches, this part concludes by 
proposing that all laws that interfere with any aspect of physician-
patient speech should be subject to a uniform standard of 
intermediate scrutiny. 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
Some commentators argue that physicians’ communications with 
their patients implicate core First Amendment values. Accordingly, 
they argue that laws regulating such communications should be 
upheld only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny, the highest standard of 
First Amendment review. This standard requires proof that the laws 
 
 182. Id. at 255. 
 183. Id. at 248. 
 184. Id. at 253. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019) 
870 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
are necessary to achieve a “compelling state interest” and that they 
have been “narrowly tailored” to accomplish that goal.185 
Paula Berg, for example, argues that physician-patient 
communications implicate core First Amendment values under both 
the “marketplace of ideas” and “personal liberty” rationales for 
protecting freedom of expression.186 The marketplace of ideas theory 
posits that the purpose of protecting free speech is to encourage the 
open competition of ideas, thereby enabling individuals to discover 
“the truth.”187 Berg argues that physician-patient discourse should be 
protected under this framework because it contributes to both “the 
patient’s truth” about the best course of medical treatment in her 
individual circumstances and to “scientific and medical truth” about 
the best way for physicians to treat similar patients in the future.188 
Under the personal liberty approach, free speech is protected because 
it safeguards private thoughts and fosters individual autonomy and 
self-determination.189 Berg argues that this approach also supports 
giving a high level of protection to physician-patient communications, 
as such speech is “essential to maintaining patients’ autonomy, self-
determination, and dignity in the face of illness” and is necessary to 
protect the patient’s right to bodily integrity.190 
Other commentators who support the application of strict 
scrutiny draw on Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases 
not involving professional speech. Martha Swartz, for example, argues 
that the Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health,191 which struck 
down a Vermont statute prohibiting pharmacies from selling 
information to pharmaceutical companies about which drugs 
particular doctors were prescribing, implies that content- or speaker-
based restrictions on speech are always subject to strict scrutiny, even 
when the restrictions relate only to commercial transactions.192 If this 
is true for restrictions on commercial speech, she argues, it must also 
be true for laws regulating physicians’ communications with their 
 
 185. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
 186. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse 
and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 235 (1994). 
 187. Id. at 231–32. 
 188. Id. at 235–36. 
 189. Id. at 234. 
 190. Id. at 237. 
 191. 564 U.S. 522 (2011). 
 192. Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After 
Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 107 (2012). 
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patients, particularly in light of “the trust-based nature of the 
physician-patient relationship.”193 
Similarly, Paul Sherman argues that restrictions on professional 
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Humanitarian Law Project,194 discussed above in 
connection with the Third Circuit’s decision in King.195 Sherman also 
relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Stevens,196 
which struck down a federal law criminalizing the sale or possession 
of depictions of animal cruelty.197 Stevens emphasized that courts do 
not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment” but instead must ask 
whether “the given category of speech has been historically treated as 
unprotected.”198 Because there is no evidence that professional speech 
was historically exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, Sherman 
concludes that content-based restrictions on such speech “should be 
treated just like any other content-defined category of speech.”199 
The problem with these arguments is that they ignore important 
differences between physician-patient communications and the type 
of speech that has traditionally enjoyed the highest level of First 
Amendment protection—speech on “matters of public concern.”200 
Allowing the government to interfere with speech on matters of 
public concern by declaring certain opinions valid and others off 
limits would be antithetical to the very concept of democratic self-
governance.201 By applying strict scrutiny in these situations, courts 
can prevent the government from stifling free public debate. 
 
 193. Id. at 121; see also Martha Swartz, Are Physician-Patient Communications 
Protected by the First Amendment?, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 92, 103 (2015). 
 194. Sherman, supra note 28, at 190. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 109–11 (discussing Humanitarian Law Project). 
 196. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 197. See Sherman, supra note 28, at 191–92. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 192; see also Smolla, supra note 28, at 112 (arguing that applying strict 
scrutiny to restrictions on professional speech “serves the valuable purpose .	.	. of filtering 
out government regulation that is not, in the classic sense, targeted at preventing criminal, 
tortious, or palpably unethical professional conduct, but instead an attempt to skew the 
marketplace of ideas or invade the buffer of confidentiality and autonomy that protects 
the integrity of the professional-client relationship”).  
 200. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (“[S]peech on ‘matters of 
public concern’ .	.	. is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–
59 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.))).  
 201. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of 
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 506 (2011) (arguing that “we all have 
a right to formal participation in the political process,” which “includes at least the right to 
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However, this preference for government agnosticism makes 
little sense when applied to the realm of professional oversight. 
Professions—particularly the so-called learned professions, such as 
medicine—are premised on the existence of a specialized body of 
knowledge, the command of which is a prerequisite for obtaining 
professional status.202 Because clients do not typically have access to 
this knowledge, it can be difficult for them to independently evaluate 
the quality of professional advice, making them vulnerable to 
exploitation by incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners. 
Professional oversight helps overcome this knowledge disparity by 
providing a mechanism for sanctioning practitioners who do not 
adhere to the profession’s internal standards of quality.203 While 
professional standards are typically flexible enough to incorporate a 
wide range of perspectives,204 there are certain positions that fall 
outside the bounds of professional norms. For example, there is a 
well-established medical consensus that childhood vaccines “do not 
cause autism.”205 In light of this consensus, physicians have faced 
disciplinary action for facilitating parents’ efforts to avoid complying 
with medically recommended vaccination schedules.206 
 
be free from coercive laws forbidding speakers from expressing some particular view on a 
matter of public concern and laws that seek to prevent audiences from hearing certain 
views because the government fears that they will be persuaded to support some unwise 
policy”).  
 202. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Hippocrates and Socrates: Professional Obligations to 
Educate the Next Generation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2016) 
(“[P]rofessionals demonstrate at least three characteristics: they apply specialized bodies 
of knowledge, maintain complex educational systems to convey that knowledge, and 
impart ethical codes as part of that education.”).  
 203. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical 
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 295 (2010) (“As an extension of the 
state’s police power, the medical board’s disciplinary authority is aimed at protecting 
medical consumers from the harms they may incur at the hands of incompetent or 
dishonest physicians.”).  
 204. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice and Negligence, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1812 (2009) (noting that, “in medical malpractice, evidence of 
compliance with noncustomary practices, if they reflect a ‘respectable minority’ school of 
thought, is not only admissible, but in some states is conclusive”).  
 205. Education and Public Awareness on Vaccine Safety and Efficacy H-440.830, AMA, 
https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/vaccine%20safety?uri=%2FAMADoc%
2FHOD.xml-0-3846.xml [perma.cc/NE9N-NFHL] (last updated 2017).  
 206. See Tara Haelle, Pediatrician Bob Sears Punished for Questionable Vaccine 
Exemption, FORBES (July 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/2018/07/01/
pediatrician-bob-sears-license-temporarily-revoked-after-questionable-vaccine-exemption/
#3a66a668ef60 [https://perma.cc/LL6S-QEZH]. To take an example from the legal 
profession, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require lawyers to bring forward 
exclusively “nonfrivolous argument[s],” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), a standard that 
presupposes that some legal arguments are objectively incorrect, see, e.g., Ahmed v. 
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Because effective professional oversight depends on the 
government’s ability to distinguish between right and wrong opinions, 
many scholars have argued that the usual presumption against 
content-based speech limitations should not apply to regulations of 
professional speech. For example, Robert Post argues that, in 
professional practice, “we insist upon competence, not debate,”207 
which implies that “[t]raditional First Amendment values would seem 
to carry very little force.”208 Noting that physicians are “routinely held 
liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing to speak,” he 
concludes that the regulation of physician speech—including 
“sanction[ing] viewpoints that are false”209—is “theoretically and 
practically inseparable from the regulation of medicine.”210 
Similarly, Claudia Haupt argues that government can 
legitimately limit professional speech based on its content. According 
to Haupt, the reason for protecting professional speech is to 
safeguard the integrity of “knowledge communities,” which she 
defines as “network[s] of individuals who share common knowledge 
and experience as a result of training and practice.”211 These 
knowledge communities have “shared notions of validity and a 
common way of knowing and reasoning,” which “limit the range of 
acceptable opinions found within them.”212 Thus, Haupt argues, 
advice that is consistent with the knowledge community’s views is 
entitled to “robust First Amendment protection,” but advice that is 
not accepted by the knowledge community should receive no First 
Amendment protection at all.213 
Recognizing the legitimacy of imposing content-based limitations 
on physician-patient communications does not necessarily mean that 
physician speech should be excluded from the First Amendment 
entirely. It does suggest, however, that strict scrutiny is not the 
appropriate standard to apply. Strict scrutiny is designed to make it 
difficult for the government to restrict speech based on the content of 
 
Gateway Grp. One, No. 12 Civ. 0524 (BMC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79386, at *3–4 
(E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (imposing sanctions on an attorney for asserting a legal argument 
with “no chance of success”).  
 207. Post, supra note 47, at 950. 
 208. Id. at 951. 
 209. Id. at 950. 
 210. Id. at 951. 
 211. Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1249–51 (2016) 
[hereinafter Haupt, Professional Speech]. 
 212. Id. at 1251. 
 213. Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 675 (2017) 
[hereinafter Haupt, Unprofessional Advice]. 
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the message,214 but, in the context of professional regulation, we want 
government to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable 
opinions and advice. Requiring government to prove that all 
regulations of physician speech are “narrowly tailored” to achieving a 
“compelling state interest” would unduly restrict government’s ability 
to carry out this function, as it would prevent regulators from taking 
action where evidence of harm is persuasive but not necessarily 
incontrovertible. As Wendy Parmet and Jason Smith point out, this is 
often true in health cases, where “empirical evidence regarding the 
impact of regulations is seldom complete and conclusive.”215 
It may be that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sorrell, Reed, 
and other cases reflect a growing view among the justices that all 
content-based restrictions on speech should be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny, even when those restrictions do not implicate matters of 
public concern. However, the Court expressly declined to reach this 
question in its 2018 decision in NIFLA,216 suggesting that a majority 
of justices might not be willing to support such an approach. 
Moreover, NIFLA suggests that, even if the Court ultimately 
concludes that content-based restrictions on most professional speech 
must satisfy strict scrutiny, regulations of treatment-related 
communications might be subject to a more deferential standard of 
review.217 Thus, unless and until the Supreme Court expressly rules 
otherwise, there is no reason for courts reviewing regulations of 
physician-patient communications to assume that strict scrutiny 
necessarily applies. 
B. Mixed Levels of Scrutiny 
Some commentators argue that certain types of laws regulating 
physician speech are more problematic than others and that these 
laws should trigger some form of heightened scrutiny—in some cases 
strict, and in others intermediate—while others should enjoy no First 
Amendment protection at all. For example, although Post argues that 
most content- and viewpoint-based regulations of professional speech 
do not implicate core First Amendment values, he believes that 
heightened scrutiny should apply in two situations. The first is when a 
law seeks to compel physicians to transmit “ideological” messages.218 
 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 200–01. 
 215. Wendy E. Parmet & Jason Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: Unraveling the 
Commercial-Professional Speech Paradox, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 912 (2017). 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 67–70. 
 218. See Post, supra note 47, at 939. 
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He argues that such laws should be subject to “rigorous and almost 
certainly fatal First Amendment scrutiny.”219 The second is when a 
law interferes with “communications involving informed consent”220 
by “requir[ing] physicians to communicate information that the 
medical profession regards as false, or prohibit[ing] physicians from 
communicating information that the medical profession regards as 
true.”221 For these laws, Post would apply the standard applicable in 
commercial speech cases,222 which is intermediate scrutiny.223 
Regarding the first category, Post argues that laws requiring 
physicians to engage in ideological speech cannot be justified as a 
form of professional regulation, because the transmission of 
ideological messages is not part of “legitimate medical practice.”224 
Other commentators have echoed Post’s criticism of ideological 
speech requirements. David Orentlicher, for example, argues that 
laws requiring physicians to transmit ideological messages “exploit 
the trust of patients in their physicians,” thereby “corrupt[ing] the 
fiduciary relationship between patient and physician.”225 Similarly, 
Janet Dolgin argues that laws regulating physician speech can be 
justified if they are reasonably connected to patient protection, but 
not if they are enacted “in service to economic ends and partisan 
belief systems.”226 
The problem with carving out ideological speech requirements 
for separate treatment, however, is that the concept of ideological 
speech is inherently malleable.227 For example, in Stuart, the Fourth 
 
 219. Id. at 957. 
 220. Id. at 979. 
 221. Id. at 939. 
 222. See id. at 978. 
 223. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) 
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 224. Post, supra note 47, at 954. 
 225. David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 9, 13 (2015). 
 226. Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan Interests 
at the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 342 (2014); see also Jennifer M. 
Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s 
Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2351 (2013) (“[S]tate 
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Circuit characterized North Carolina’s law requiring physicians to 
display the results of sonograms to women seeking abortions as an 
ideological requirement because it was designed “to convince women 
seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess their decisions.”228 
But, in Lakey, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas’s virtually 
identical requirement was not ideological because it involved “the 
purest conceivable expression of ‘factual information.’”229 It found 
that any impact the information had on the woman’s decision-making 
process would be the result of “her own ‘ideology’ .	.	. not of any 
‘ideology’ inherent in the information she has learned.”230 In other 
contexts, however, even purely factual disclosure requirements have 
been described as ideological. For example, in his concurring opinion 
in NIFLA, Justice Kennedy applied the “ideological” label to 
California’s law requiring CPCs to inform women that the state 
provided free or low-cost pregnancy-related services.231 The required 
disclosure was obviously factual, but Justice Kennedy was troubled by 
the fact that it was designed to “promote the State’s own preferred 
message advertising abortions.”232 Overall, it is hard to discern any 
consistent test for defining an ideological message. It seems that the 
label is most often applied after a court has already determined that a 
speech requirement is substantively inappropriate, rather than as a 
neutral way for distinguishing between different categories of 
speech.233 
Indeed, virtually all speech requirements could be characterized 
as ideological in one sense or another. Although the concept of 
ideological speech is often used to describe politically motivated 
messages, the literal definition of an “ideology” is simply a “body of 
 
speech is or is not ideological.”); Sawicki, Informed Consent, supra note 226, at 14 (“[T]he 
definition of what counts as ‘ideological’ speech is widely disputed.”). 
 228. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 229. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
 230. Id. 
 231. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The California 
Legislature included in its official history the congratulatory statement that the Act was 
part of California’s legacy of ‘forward thinking.’ .	.	. But it is not forward thinking to force 
individuals to ‘be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of 
view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.’” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977))). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Cf. Ronald H. Silverman, Weak Law Teaching, Adam Smith and a New Model of 
Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 293 (2000) (“[W]e commonly reserve 
pejorative terms like ideology or propaganda for those value systems that we do not 
like.”). 
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ideas.”234 The practice of medicine incorporates multiple ideologies, 
ranging from the foundational principle of “do no harm”235 to specific 
maxims like “treat patients with the least invasive therapy first.”236 
The entire doctrine of informed consent can be seen as an ideological 
regulation of the practice of medicine insofar as it is grounded in 
philosophical views about the centrality of patient autonomy in 
medical decision-making.237 Thus, under a broad interpretation of the 
concept of ideology, heightened scrutiny could potentially apply to 
virtually all regulations of physician-patient speech. 
Post’s second category for applying heightened scrutiny 
encompasses laws that interfere with physician-patient 
“communications involving informed consent.”238 He argues that, just 
as commercial speech doctrine protects consumers’ right to receive 
information necessary to make enlightened purchasing decisions, the 
First Amendment should also protect patients’ right to the 
information necessary to make informed medical choices.239 Other 
commentators have also suggested that restrictions on physician 
speech are most problematic when they interfere with the process of 
 
 234. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & 
Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1886 (2006) (“[I]deology typically is thought to mean 
a common and coherent philosophy, outlook, or shared body of ideas or beliefs or a 
worldview or cultural belief system that helps individuals (or groups) generate and inform 
their decisionmaking process.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 349, 372 (1984) (“Generally, ideology refers descriptively to the set of 
beliefs, norms, attitudes, and concepts held by an individual or widely held within a group 
of individuals.”). 
 235. See, e.g., Katie Page, The Four Principles: Can They Be Measured and Do They 
Predict Ethical Decision Making, 13 BMC MED. ETHICS 1, 2 (2012) (“The Hippocratic 
injunction to do no harm has been an axiom central to the education of medical and 
graduate students.”); cf. Sahreen Malik Bhanji, Health Care Ethics, 4 J. CLINICAL RES. 
BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2013) (describing “trustworthiness and honesty” as part of the “ideology 
and core values of nursing”). 
 236. See, e.g., Carl G. Klutke & John J. Klutke, Interstitial Cystitis/Painful Bladder 
Syndrome for the Primary Care Physician, 15 CANADIAN J. UROLOGY (SUPP. 1) 44, 48 
(2008) (“Certainly, as with any disease that tends to be of chronic nature and requires 
continuous or at least intermittent treatment, one main tenet is to apply the least invasive 
therapy that affords sufficient relief of symptoms.”). 
 237. See Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent, supra note 77, at 827–29; cf. Ann 
Kelly, Research and the Subject: The Practice of Informed Consent, 26 POLAR 182, 188 
(2003) (discussing “the ideology of informed consent” as applied to ethnographic 
research). 
 238. See Post, supra note 47, at 979–80. Post acknowledges that his concerns about 
inappropriate intrusion into physician-patient communications might sometimes 
“transcend the narrow confines of informed consent disclosures,” but he worries that 
expanding First Amendment protection more broadly could “threaten[] to restrict the 
state’s ability freely to regulate the provision of medical treatment.” Id. 
 239. Id. at 978. 
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informed consent to treatment. Sonia Suter, for example, argues that 
“professional speech associated with informed consent is high value 
speech” and that restrictions on such speech “require heightened, if 
not strict, scrutiny.”240 Emphasizing the importance of informed 
consent to autonomous decision-making, Suter argues that 
heightened scrutiny is necessary to ensure that physicians and patients 
have “sufficient discretion” to engage in an “individualized 
dialogue.”241 Suter recognizes that states generally have considerable 
leeway in enacting laws regulating medical treatments, but she argues 
that laws interfering with the “decision-making process” about 
treatment should be subjected to a higher standard because of the 
“self-determination and autonomy goals of protecting speech.”242 
Yet, while informed consent is undoubtedly a central aspect of 
the physician-patient relationship, the idea that there exists a distinct 
category of “informed consent discussions,” separate and apart from 
other physician-patient communications, is an artificial construct. As 
bioethicists have long stressed, informed consent is most 
appropriately viewed as an ongoing, interactive process, rather than a 
one-way disclosure of information conducted at a particular moment 
in time.243 Virtually any aspect of physician-patient communications 
can be viewed as part of this process as long as it has the potential to 
affect patients’ decisions about the type of medical treatment they are 
willing to undergo. 
For example, the federal policy at issue in Conant, which 
penalized physicians who recommended medical marijuana to their 
patients, would not initially appear to involve an informed consent 
communication; its purpose was to prevent physicians from making a 
particular treatment recommendation, rather than to force physicians 
to describe proposed treatments in any particular way. Yet the policy 
could also be viewed as interfering with patients’ ability to provide 
informed consent to other treatments for which medical marijuana 
might be considered a reasonable alternative. For example, a patient 
might be better able to assess the risks and benefits of taking opioids 
for pain if she knew that marijuana might provide similar benefits 
 
 240. Suter, supra note 48, at 22. 
 241. Id. at 27. 
 242. Id. at 28. 
 243. See, e.g., Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed 
Consent, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 855, 859 (2015) (noting the “need for ongoing 
communication processes that allow the incorporation of changing information and 
changed expectations over time”). 
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with a lower risk of addiction.244 To the extent the federal policy 
prevented physicians from discussing this alternative with their 
patients, it could be seen as a limitation on “communications 
involving informed consent,” even though the policy did not directly 
address the process of informed consent at all. 
It might be possible to overcome this definitional problem by 
broadening the scope of heightened scrutiny to any laws that prohibit 
or compel the provision or solicitation of information about medical 
treatment, regardless of whether the information technically falls 
within the parameters of an informed consent discussion. Such an 
approach would be similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup, 
which distinguished between laws interfering with communications 
about medical treatment and laws regulating medical treatment 
carried out through the mechanism of speech.245 However, as the 
Third Circuit recognized in King, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Humanitarian Law Project casts significant doubt on the 
constitutional validity of that distinction.246 
More generally, any effort to distinguish between discussions 
about treatment from treatment itself ignores how deeply speech and 
treatment are intertwined in the medical context. A growing body of 
literature recognizes that the manner in which physicians 
communicate with patients has a significant impact on medical 
outcomes, independent of the specific treatments provided. For 
example, in sixteen of the twenty-one randomized studies reviewed in 
one article, the manner in which physicians communicated with 
patients was shown to have a significant influence on outcomes such 
as pain control, blood pressure and blood sugar levels, and emotional 
health.247 Some studies have identified poor provider-patient 
communication as a key reason why members of minority groups 
 
 244. See Kevin P. Hill, Medical Marijuana for Treatment of Chronic Pain and Other 
Medical and Psychiatric Problems, 313 JAMA 2474, 2474 (2015) (finding that “use of 
marijuana for chronic pain, neuropathic pain, and spasticity due to multiple sclerosis is 
supported by high-quality evidence”). 
 245. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 246. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2010). 
 247. John M. Travaline, Robert Ruchinskas & Gilbert E. D’Alonzo, Patient-Physician 
Communication: Why and How, 105 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 13, 14 (2005); see also 
Charlotte Blease, The Principle of Parity: The “Placebo Effect” and Physician 
Communication, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 199, 200–01 (2011) (reporting that patients whose 
physicians adopted a “friendly, tactful and supportive communication style” experienced 
“substantial improvements” in medical outcomes, including an average two-day reduction 
in postcoronary surgery hospital stay). 
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frequently experience fewer benefits from medical interventions than 
the general population.248 
Several mechanisms have been suggested to explain how 
physician-patient communications might influence medical outcomes. 
One commentator posits that “[t]he physician’s style of 
communication can promote a sense of empowerment among patients 
by encouraging them to believe that the situation is optimistic and 
that their actions will promote recovery” and that this attitude can 
itself engender positive outcomes.249 Others argue that 
communication styles affect patients’ sense of connection with 
physicians and that this connection “can ultimately improve their 
health mediated through participation in their care, adherence to 
treatment, and patient self-management.”250 Whatever the precise 
mechanism, the existence of a link between physician communication 
and medical outcomes suggests that all physician speech is potentially 
therapeutic. As a result, the effort to create different standards for 
speech about treatment and speech that is treatment is unlikely to 
succeed. 
Timothy Zick suggests another basis for carving out particular 
categories of physician speech for heightened constitutional 
protection—the distinction between the “application of general 
standards of professional care, which can indirectly regulate 
speech,”251 and regulations of “professional-client communications 
about, concerning, or relating to the recognition, scope, or exercise of 
constitutional rights.”252 Examples of the latter sort of regulation 
include laws targeting physician-patient communications about 
abortion253 or the right to bear arms.254 According to Zick, these types 
 
 248. Gregory B. Diette & Cynthia Rand, The Contributing Role of Health-Care 
Communication to Health Disparities for Minority Patients with Asthma, 132 CHEST J. 
(SUPP.) 802S, 802S–03S (2007).  
 249. Blease, supra note 247, at 200. 
 250. Impact of Communication in Healthcare, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE COMM. (July 
2011), http://healthcarecomm.org/about-us/impact-of-communication-in-healthcare 
[https://perma.cc/UVA6-BYTJ]; see also John M. Kelley et al., The Influence of the 
Patient-Clinician Relationship on Healthcare Outcomes: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 9 PLOS ONE, no. e94207, Apr. 9, 2014, at 1, 1–
2 (arguing that “cognitive care”—defined as “information gathering, sharing medical 
information, patient education, and expectation management”—is “likely to produce 
richer interpersonal interactions”).  
 251. Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1336 (2015). 
 252. Id. at 1294. 
 253. See id. at 1328–29 (“[L]aws compelling physicians to disclose detailed, content-
specific information regarding abortion, or to present ideological messages to patients .	.	. 
ought to be treated as suspect under the First Amendment.”). 
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of professional speech regulations “are, and ought generally to be 
treated as, regulations of political expression based on content” and 
therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.255 
However, Zick’s proposal to apply strict scrutiny to all laws 
limiting professional speech related to the exercise of constitutional 
rights would appear to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s plurality 
opinion in Casey, which upheld mandatory disclosures related to 
abortion under a lower standard of review.256 Moreover, even if his 
approach could somehow be reconciled with Casey, it is difficult to 
see how it would constitute much of a limit in the context of 
physician-patient speech. Given that competent individuals have a 
constitutionally protected interest in refusing unwanted bodily 
invasions,257 virtually all physician-patient communications can be 
viewed as speech related to the exercise of a constitutional right, at 
least to the extent they relate to invasive medical treatments the 
patient might potentially undergo. Thus, at least in the medical 
context, Zick’s proposal to limit heightened scrutiny to professional 
speech related to the exercise of constitutional rights might not 
amount to much of a limitation at all. 
Finally, Haupt’s approach to physician speech also rejects the 
uniform application of heightened scrutiny in the context of 
professional speech regulations. As discussed above, Haupt’s view is 
that the First Amendment protects professional speech only to the 
extent it falls within the “range of knowledge that is acceptable as 
good professional advice,” as determined by the profession’s own 
internal standards of acceptability.258 Thus, rather than applying a 
uniform standard of heightened scrutiny to all legislative restrictions 
on physician-patient communications, she suggests a sliding scale of 
 
 254. See id. at 1327 (arguing that the Florida firearms statute challenged in 
Wollschlaeger should have been subjected to strict scrutiny because “what it actually 
regulates is a conversation relating to the right to bear arms”). 
 255. Id. at 1359. 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 38–52. 
 257. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (first citing 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980); then citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 
(1979)) (discussing cases that “support the recognition of a general liberty interest in 
refusing medical treatment”); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) 
(recognizing that prisoners have “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs”). 
 258. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 213, at 675; see supra text 
accompanying note 213. 
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judicial review, in which “[t]he further state regulation diverges from 
professional consensus[,] .	.	. the more skeptical courts ought to be.”259 
However, it is difficult to see how such a sliding scale approach 
would be workable in practice. Consider a case in which plaintiffs 
challenge a law regulating physician speech, and the state’s response 
(perhaps supported by explicit legislative findings) is that the law 
simply codifies an existing consensus within the professional 
community. Under Haupt’s approach, heightened scrutiny will apply 
only if the court refuses to defer to the state’s assertion of 
professional consensus and instead independently determines that the 
law is, in fact, inconsistent with prevailing professional opinion. Yet, 
while there is no mathematically precise relationship between tiers of 
constitutional scrutiny and courts’ willingness to defer to a 
legislature’s factual findings,260 as a practical matter the two questions 
tend to be highly interrelated. In particular, courts are more likely to 
be deferential to legislative factual findings under a rational basis 
standard261 and more likely to question legislative findings when 
applying heightened scrutiny.262 As a result, Haupt’s approach creates 
a kind of catch-22: to apply heightened scrutiny, courts must be 
willing to second-guess states’ assertions about the state of 
professional opinion, but this kind of second-guessing is unlikely 
unless the court has already determined that heightened scrutiny is 
the appropriate standard to apply.263 
 
 259. Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE 
L.J.F. 150, 153, 171 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Haupt_xv7cdx9m.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3T2-PUNK].  
 260. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-
Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (2009) (“The constitutional tiers of review .	.	. are neither a 
reliable predictor of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding nor an acceptable guide to 
the appropriateness of such deference.”). 
 261. See William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 921 (2013) (“[W]hen 
courts apply the rational basis standard, they do not insist on proof that an actual state of 
affairs exists; rather, they are content to presume the existence of facts necessary to 
establish the requisite connection to a legitimate government purpose.”). 
 262. See id. (“As part of its insistence on the least possible intrusion on the protected 
value, heightened scrutiny requires that the reviewing court have in front of it the actual 
facts of the situation—the government’s actual interest and the real factual background.”). 
 263. For this reason, Wendy Parmet and Jason Smith suggest that Haupt’s proposed 
approach might be better characterized as a form of heightened scrutiny in disguise. See 
Parmet & Smith, supra note 215, at 902 n.131 (arguing that “[a]lthough Haupt criticizes 
the Eleventh Circuit for concluding that [the Florida statute’s] lack of content neutrality 
required heightened scrutiny,” the approach she proposes “can easily be viewed as a form 
of heightened scrutiny” to the extent that it rejects “the radical deference to the legislature 
that usually marks rational basis review”). 
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Rather than attempting to carve out specific categories of 
physician speech for heightened First Amendment protection, a 
better approach would be to apply a uniform standard of 
intermediate scrutiny to all regulations interfering with physician-
patient speech. By requiring proof that speech restrictions “directly 
advance the State’s interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or 
ineffective professional practices and are no more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest,”264 intermediate scrutiny adequately 
protects physicians’ and patients’ interest in open medical 
communications. At the same time, unlike strict scrutiny, the standard 
is not so demanding that it would preclude legitimate regulatory 
efforts to uphold professional quality. The next part of this Article 
considers how a uniform standard of intermediate scrutiny can be 
applied in a manner that promotes both of these goals. 
III.  APPLYING THE STANDARD 
Virtually all of the lower court decisions discussed in Part I were 
decided under intermediate scrutiny, but the results of those cases 
were far from consistent. The differences in outcome result from 
disagreement about the types of state interests that should be counted 
in the analysis, as well as how the strengths of those interests are 
appropriately assessed. This part argues that, rather than simply 
looking at any interest asserted by the government and then deciding 
whether it is “important,” courts applying intermediate scrutiny 
should ask whether laws interfering with physician speech are 
substantially related to the specific governmental interest in 
upholding the quality of professional practice. It further argues that 
the assessment of whether a law is consistent with this standard 
should generally be decided with reference to the views of the 
professional community. Contrary to those proposed by other 
commentators, however, the standard proposed here would not 
require lawmakers to defer to the professional community’s views in 
all situations. 
A. Defining and Assessing the State’s Interests 
Some courts have upheld limitations on physician-patient 
communications under intermediate scrutiny by balancing physicians’ 
First Amendment rights against an excessively broad range of 
governmental interests. In Rounds I, for example, the Eighth Circuit 
 
 264. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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justified South Dakota’s requirement that physicians inform pregnant 
women that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being” in part by citing the state’s authority to 
promote childbirth over abortion.265 In one of the vacated panel 
decisions in Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit justified Florida’s 
prohibition on routine requests about firearm ownership in part by 
citing the state’s interest in “protection of the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms.”266 
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the underlying 
justification for applying intermediate—as opposed to strict—scrutiny 
to governmental regulations of professional speech. As discussed 
above, the government should be entitled to exercise greater control 
over professional speech than other types of communications to 
uphold the profession’s internal standards of quality for the benefit of 
clients who lack the knowledge to independently evaluate the quality 
of professional advice.267 Given this justification, upholding a 
professional speech regulation under intermediate scrutiny should 
depend on a showing that the law is in fact substantially related to the 
state’s interest in upholding professional quality. If the state seeks to 
defend a restriction on professional speech by appealing to other 
governmental interests, it should have the burden of meeting the 
same standard of strict scrutiny applicable to content-based 
regulations of nonprofessional speech. 
The critical question then becomes how courts should determine 
whether a particular speech restriction in fact promotes professional 
quality. At one extreme, it might be argued that if a state asserts that 
a limitation on professional speech is a necessary quality control 
mechanism courts should generally defer to that judgment—absent, 
perhaps, evidence that the state’s quality claims are pretexts for 
nefarious purposes, such as restricting politically unpopular ideas. 
This argument would rest on the fact that the right to practice a 
profession depends on having a state-issued license, and license 
holders must agree to adhere to conditions established by the state.268 
 
 265. See Rounds I, 530 F.3d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting the Supreme 
Court’s statement that “[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to 
show its profound respect for the life within the woman” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007))). 
 266. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 202–13. 
 268. See Michael S. Young & Rachel K. Alexander, Recognizing the Nature of 
American Medical Practice: An Argument for Adopting Federal Medical Licensure, 13 
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Because the state sets the conditions under which professionals may 
practice, it might be argued, the definition of professional quality is 
ultimately within the state’s control. 
This view of professional authority seems to have driven at least 
one of the panel decisions in Wollschlaeger, in which the court gave 
short shrift to the argument that prohibiting physicians from making 
routine inquiries about firearm ownership was unconstitutional 
because it violated professional medical standards. Specifically, 
although the court acknowledged that “[s]everal medical associations 
.	.	. have policies that endorse physicians’ practice of asking questions 
and providing counseling regarding firearms,”269 it found that these 
professional statements were irrelevant because “Florida may 
regulate professional standards of medical care within its borders—
regardless of what medical associations may recommend.”270 As 
support for this conclusion, the panel cited the Supreme Court’s 1954 
decision in Barsky v. Board of Regents,271 which recognized that “[t]he 
practice of medicine .	.	. is lawfully prohibited by the State except 
upon the conditions it imposes.”272 
The argument that professional standards of care are ultimately 
subordinate to the government’s regulatory authority cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. When regulating pure conduct, as opposed to 
speech, the government is generally under no obligation to defer to 
professional opinion. It seems clear, for example, that a physician who 
sought to treat patients with an illegal psychedelic drug could not rely 
on emerging professional support of such therapy273 as a defense to a 
 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 145, 166–67 (2010) (describing the state-based system of 
medical licensure). 
 269. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1216 n.11 (11th Cir. 2014), 
vacated on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 
2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 270. Id. (citing Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954)). 
 271. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).  
 272. Id. at 451 (upholding a six-month suspension of a physician’s medical license for 
refusing to produce documents in response to a subpoena issued by the Committee on Un-
American Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives). 
 273. See, e.g., Robin L. Carhart-Harris et al., Psilocybin with Psychological Support for 
Treatment-Resistant Depression: An Open-Label Feasibility Study, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 
619, 619 (2016) (finding “preliminary support for the safety and efficacy of psilocybin for 
treatment-resistant depression”); Alicia L. Danforth et al., MDMA-Assisted Therapy: A 
New Treatment Model for Social Anxiety in Autistic Adults, 64 PROGRESS NEURO-
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY & BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 237, 237 (2016) (showing that 
MDMA-assisted therapy could reduce social anxiety symptoms and increase social 
adaptability); Ben Sessa & Matthew W. Johnson, Can Psychedelic Compounds Play a Part 
in Drug Dependence Therapy? 206 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2015) (examining the 
“revisiting of psychedelic drug therapy throughout psychiatry”). 
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charge of criminal drug distribution. More generally, while the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has consistently asserted a policy 
of noninterference with the practice of medicine,274 physicians 
generally cannot treat patients with drugs or devices that have not 
received FDA approval or clearance for at least one indication,275 
even if their assessment of the risks and benefits to the patient are 
consistent with prevailing medical norms.276 
Yet lawmakers do not have unbridled authority to disregard 
professional medical opinion. In Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt,277 for example, the Court struck down a Texas law 
requiring abortion providers to meet the same standards as 
ambulatory surgery centers and to have admitting privileges at a 
hospital within thirty miles of the facility.278 Rather than deferring to 
the State’s own assessment of medical necessity,279 the Court 
conducted its own analysis of the benefits and burdens of the 
challenged requirements, drawing heavily on the opinions of relevant 
professional groups.280 The regulations at issue in Whole Woman’s 
Health can be distinguished from ordinary regulations of medical 
practice because they affected women’s constitutionally protected 
interest in obtaining an abortion. However, the same can be said for 
 
 274. W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 
441 (2017) (“FDA has long taken the position—and others have long understood—that it 
does not regulate the practice of medicine.”). 
 275. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that 
drugs may not be introduced into interstate commerce until the FDA has approved them 
for a specific use but that, after drugs are approved, physicians may prescribe them for 
both approved and unapproved uses). 
 276. Limited exceptions apply to the use of investigational drugs for the treatment of 
serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions in patients unable to participate in 
clinical trials, assuming the manufacturers are willing to make the drug available. See 21 
C.F.R. §§	312.300–.320 (2018) (governing FDA’s expanded access program for patients 
with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases or conditions); see also 21 U.S.C.A. 
§	360bbb-0a (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5, 116-8, & 116-12) (authorizing 
manufacturers to provide investigational drugs to patients with a “life-threatening disease 
or condition” outside the FDA’s expanded access program). However, these exceptions 
were created by regulation or statute; as a matter of constitutional law, patients do not 
have a right to be treated with drugs that have not received FDA approval. See Abigail 
All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting terminally ill patients’ assertion of a constitutional right to 
access unapproved drugs). 
 277. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).  
 278. Id. at 2300. 
 279. See id. at 2310 (rejecting the court of appeals’s conclusion that “legislatures, and 
not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty”). 
 280. Id. at 2312–13, 2315–18 (citing professional associations’ amicus briefs). 
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regulations of professional speech, which directly implicate First 
Amendment rights.281 
More generally, even assuming that regulatory authority 
generally trumps professional standards in the area of medical 
products or procedures, the logic of such an approach does not apply 
to regulations affecting speech. Decisions about whether to allow 
patients to use a new drug or other intervention reflect a balancing of 
risks and benefits to the overall population,282 as well as policy 
considerations like the need to create incentives for manufacturers to 
invest resources in conducting clinical trials.283 These assessments 
implicate broad questions of social policy about which professional 
medical standards should not be determinative. By contrast, as 
discussed above, the primary justification for regulating professional 
speech is to counterbalance the inherent knowledge disparity 
between professionals and clients, which makes individuals 
vulnerable to exploitation by incompetent or unscrupulous 
practitioners.284 The only way to achieve this goal is if professional 
regulations are informed by those who have the specialized 
knowledge and experience that laypersons lack—i.e., members of the 
professional community itself. In fact, states themselves recognize this 
need, which is why regulatory bodies charged with overseeing 
professionals, such as licensing boards, are typically comprised 
predominantly of members of the regulated profession.285 
 
 281. See Suter, supra note 48, at 27 (arguing that regulation of physician speech should 
be treated “less deferentially than state regulation of medical care” because “regulating 
speech, as opposed to medical conduct, affects information disclosure, which deserves 
heightened protection” under the First Amendment). 
 282. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 1 (2017) (calling on the FDA to “incorporat[e] individual and 
societal considerations into its risk-benefit framework for opioid approval and 
monitoring”); id. at 397 (stating that the FDA should consider the “broader societal 
consequences” of opioid use, including “diversion and the overall impact of addiction on 
the health and well-being of patients who develop” opioid use disorder in its risk-benefit 
assessments of opioids). 
 283. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Right to Experimental Treatment: FDA New Drug 
Approval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public’s Health, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 274 
(2009) (observing that allowing patients to access experimental drugs directly, without 
enrolling in FDA-overseen clinical trials, “could seriously hamper scientific research and 
undermine drug innovation”). 
 284. See supra text accompanying notes 202–13. 
 285. See John Lunstroth, Voluntary Self-Regulation of Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine Practitioners, 70 ALB. L. REV. 209, 238 (2006) (noting that state licensure laws 
“delegate authority to regulate the occupation to the profession itself which then functions 
through a board whose members are drawn from the profession”). 
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Thus, to determine whether a regulation of professional speech is 
reasonably related to the state’s interest in upholding professional 
quality, courts should consider evidence bearing on the professional 
community’s opinions. Such evidence might include whether the 
restriction was developed in consultation with members of the 
profession, as well as testimony from practitioners as to whether the 
restriction supports or hinders their professional goals.286 This kind of 
evidence played a central role in the Third Circuit’s decision in King, 
which upheld New Jersey’s ban on SOCE in large part because it was 
enacted with professional support.287 
In addition to considering the views of members of the 
professional community, courts should take judicial notice of certain 
inherent attributes of professional-client relationships that exist 
independently of the particular subject matter being regulated. For 
example, in Velazquez, the Supreme Court observed that “the 
traditional role of the attorney” includes “complete analysis of the 
case, full advice to the client, and proper presentation to the court.”288 
In its decision in Conant, the Ninth Circuit relied on this observation 
to conclude that a federal rule prohibiting physicians from 
recommending medical marijuana violated professional standards 
because it prevented physicians from conveying accurate and 
complete information based on an individualized assessment of the 
 
 286. Considering the views of the professional community does not necessarily mean 
deferring to organized professional groups like the AMA. Unlike in some countries, 
professional organizations in the U.S. are voluntary associations with no formal powers. 
See Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving from 
Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1179, 1182 n.11 (2006) (“[M]embership in professional associations is not 
required for practice, and nonmembers cannot be disciplined.” (quoting John H. Colteaux, 
Note, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STAN. L. REV. 900, 901 
(1965))). Even the most prominent groups, such as the AMA, typically represent only a 
minority of practitioners. See Ariel R. Schwartz, Note, Doubtful Duty: Physicians’ Legal 
Obligation to Treat During an Epidemic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 662 (2007) (noting that the 
AMA represents only a quarter of physicians currently practicing in the United States). 
Professional organizations’ opinions will therefore not always represent the views of the 
profession overall. In some cases, the views expressed by particular professional 
associations may be driven by extraneous factors such as conflicts of interest or political 
calculations, rather than a genuine application of professional standards and expertise. 
 287. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 238 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 288. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544, 546 (2001). Similarly, in Rust v. 
Sullivan, the Court suggested that, even in the context of government-funded health 
services, laws that prevent physicians from providing complete medical advice might raise 
First Amendment problems if the physician-patient relationship is “sufficiently all 
encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive 
medical advice.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). 
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patient’s particular needs.289 Similarly, in Stuart, the Fourth Circuit 
cited several basic principles of professionalism in striking down 
North Carolina’s requirement for physicians to display and describe 
the results of a sonogram to women seeking abortions, including the 
physician’s obligation to make an “independent medical judgment”290 
and “to inform and assist the patient without imposing his or her own 
personal will and values on the patient.”291 Restrictions on speech that 
do not respect these basic requirements cannot plausibly be justified 
as efforts to promote the state’s interest in upholding professional 
quality. 
Some commentators would go further and require courts to give 
conclusive weight to professional standards in assessing professional 
speech regulations, rather than merely requiring consideration of such 
standards as part of their analysis. For example, Haupt argues that 
“[t]he First Amendment .	.	. should provide a shield against the state’s 
requirement that professionals dispense unprofessional advice”292 and 
that “the distinction between good and bad advice should be drawn 
by the knowledge community.”293 As support for this position, she 
argues that under the law of medical malpractice “it is the profession 
itself that determines what constitutes reasonable care, and courts 
have long awarded deference to the profession in such cases.”294 
However, the claim that regulations of professional speech must 
always be consistent with the norms and standards of the professional 
community ignores the fact that professional quality is a multifaceted 
concept that includes both technical and nontechnical dimensions. In 
the medical context, technical components of quality relate to 
methods for diagnosing, treating, and preventing diseases and 
conditions, whereas nontechnical aspects include “the interpersonal 
(e.g., communication, teamwork), cognitive (e.g., decision-making, 
situational awareness) and personal resource skills (e.g., coping with 
stress and fatigue).”295 While professionals’ training and expertise 
 
 289. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883–84 (1992) (plurality opinion)); see also Jack M. 
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 
1218 n.147 (2016) (recognizing “a constitutional interest in the development and faithful 
application of professional knowledge”). 
 290. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 291. Id. at 252. 
 292. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 213, at 728. 
 293. Id. at 705. 
 294. Id. at 708. 
 295. Riaz A. Agha, Alexander J. Fowler & Nick Sevdalis, The Role of Non-Technical 
Skills in Surgery, 4 ANNALS MED. & SURGERY 422, 424 (2015); see also R. Flin & N. 
Maran, Identifying and Training Non-Technical Skills for Teams in Acute Medicine, 13 
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make them uniquely qualified to evaluate the technical aspects of 
quality, they do not necessarily make them experts on the 
nontechnical dimensions. In fact, in Canterbury v. Spence,296 one of 
the leading cases establishing the modern doctrine of informed 
consent, the court specifically concluded that judgments about how 
physicians should communicate with patients (part of the 
“interpersonal” dimension of quality) are often “non-medical” in 
nature.297 As a result, the court found that the standard for assessing 
the adequacy of physicians’ disclosures to patients should be based on 
whether a “reasonable patient” would find the information 
“material” to her decision, without regard to the professional 
community’s prevailing practices or views.298 
Moreover, while courts have traditionally deferred to 
professional standards in medical malpractice cases, deference to 
professional judgment is not absolute. As Philip Peters has 
documented, in several jurisdictions, medical malpractice juries are 
instructed to make their own judgment about what a “reasonable 
physician” would have done under the circumstances rather than 
simply basing their decision on prevailing professional norms.299 
Similarly, courts evaluating restrictions on physician speech should 
have the option of rejecting professional opinion when they conclude 
that the professional community’s views do not comport with larger 
societal conceptions of reasonableness.300 For example, even if a 
substantial segment of the professional community believed it was 
appropriate to attempt to change minors’ sexual orientation, courts 
still could legitimately uphold anti-SOCE laws as legitimate efforts to 
protect the civil rights of sexual minorities.301 
 
QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE (SUPP. 1) i80, i82 (2004) (identifying gathering and 
exchanging information as key elements of anesthesiologists’ nontechnical skills).  
 296. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 297. Id. at 785 (“The decision to unveil the patient’s condition and the chances as to 
remediation .	.	. is oftentimes a non-medical judgment.”). 
 298. See id. at 786–87. 
 299. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice 
Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 187–88 (2000) (“Modern 
malpractice law is moving slowly away from a custom-based standard of care and toward a 
reasonable physician standard.”). 
 300. Similarly, Parmet and Smith argue that “the ultimate question is whether the 
regulation of health-related speech protects health,” not whether it conforms to “the 
profession’s own perspectives and methodologies.” Parmet & Smith, supra note 215, at 
914. As an example, they suggest that “[a] law prohibiting physicians from urging patients 
to smoke by claiming that smoking was good for their health .	.	. would pass muster even if 
the AMA recommended otherwise.” Id. 
 301. See Ignatius Yordan Nugraha, The Compatibility of Sexual Orientation Change 
Efforts with International Human Rights Law, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 176, 192 (2017) 
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B. Application to Cases 
Under the approach proposed above, the appropriate resolution 
of most of the cases discussed in Part I of this Article should be 
readily apparent. On the one hand, the prohibitions on SOCE at issue 
in Pickup and King would survive intermediate scrutiny because they 
were substantially related to the state’s interest in promoting 
professional quality, as indicated by their uniform support among 
professional organizations. On the other hand, the federal ban on 
recommending medical marijuana in Conant, the Florida law 
prohibiting routine requests about firearm ownership in 
Wollschlaeger, and the compelled abortion disclosures in Rounds I 
and II, Lakey, and Stuart would all be struck down. In addition to 
conflicting with inherent norms of professional-client relationships, 
most of these laws were opposed by professional medical 
associations.302 Moreover, there were no factors present in these cases 
that would give courts any reason to depart from the professional 
community’s views. In fact, the defendants in most of those cases did 
not even attempt to describe the challenged laws as efforts to uphold 
professional quality. Rather, in Conant, the ban on recommending 
medical marijuana was justified as an effort to enforce the 
government’s policy against the distribution of controlled 
substances,303 while the abortion disclosure laws appeared to be 
primarily intended to discourage abortion.304 
 
(concluding that international human rights law “requires States to prohibit SOCE for 
minors as a whole”). 
 302. In Conant, the California Medical Association submitted an amicus brief in 
support of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the federal policy. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 
629, 631 (9th Cir. 2002). In Wollschlaeger, the Florida chapters of the American Academy 
of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and the American College of 
Physicians were part of the group of plaintiffs challenging the Florida law. See 
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 
2017). In the abortion disclosure cases, amici supporting the plaintiffs included the 
American College of Pediatricians, see Rounds II, 686 F.3d 889, 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc), and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American 
Medical Association, and the American Public Health Association, see Stuart v. Camnitz, 
774 F.3d 238, 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 303. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 632–33.  
 304. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246 (noting that “the clear and conceded purpose” of North 
Carolina’s mandatory disclosure requirement “is to support the state’s pro-life position”); 
Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 906 (suggesting that required disclosures might “encourage the 
patient to choose childbirth over abortion” (quoting Rounds I, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc))); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the required disclosures “might cause the woman 
to choose childbirth over abortion” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 889 (1992))). 
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The most challenging case for the proposed standard is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Casey. On the one hand, Pennsylvania’s 
mandatory disclosures were similar to those at issue in Rounds I and 
II, Lakey, and Stuart in that they were primarily designed to 
discourage abortion. On the other hand, the focus of the required 
disclosures was the risks and alternatives to abortion, which are 
standard elements of informed consent.305 Admittedly, the required 
disclosures were unbalanced—they emphasized reasons against 
having an abortion without also disclosing the potential benefits of 
the procedure306—but they at least were limited to factual information 
that a reasonable patient would arguably want to know. Moreover, as 
the Ninth Circuit observed in Conant, the law did not prevent 
physicians from exercising independent medical judgment because it 
allowed for exceptions when the disclosure would have a “severely 
adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.”307 
Courts can therefore apply Casey in a manner that remains 
deferential to professional standards. For example, consistent with 
Casey, courts can emphasize the importance of limiting mandatory 
disclosures to the traditional elements of informed consent—i.e., 
factual information about risks, benefits, and alternatives—as 
opposed to sensational efforts to provoke an emotional reaction, such 
as forcing patients to view ultrasound images even when they are 
averting their eyes.308 Moreover, courts can insist that, like the 
Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey, other mandatory disclosure laws 
allow for exceptions in cases where a physician reasonably determines 
 
 305. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The topics 
importantly demanding a communication of information are the inherent and potential 
hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the 
results likely if the patient remains untreated.”). 
 306. In fact, prior to Casey, the Supreme Court had struck down similar informed 
consent statutes in the abortion context for precisely this reason. See Thornburgh v. Am. 
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (characterizing another 
compelled disclosure law as “nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the 
Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent 
dialogue between the woman and her physician”); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (striking down a city ordinance requiring specific 
disclosures to women undergoing abortions on the ground “that much of the information 
required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to 
withhold it altogether”). 
 307. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 883–84 (1992)); Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 211, at 1260 (observing 
that the Pennsylvania statute “neither required that the providers communicate this 
information as their own .	.	. nor prohibited the providers from expressing their 
disagreement with the state’s policy” and that “there was a provision for physicians to 
refrain from providing certain information if they deemed it harmful to their patients”). 
 308. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243. 
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that the disclosure would have an adverse effect on the patient’s 
physical or mental health. 
What are the implications of the standard proposed here for the 
other mandatory disclosure laws mentioned in the introduction to this 
Article, which have not been the subject of litigation?309 Unlike the 
compelled abortion disclosure laws, most of these laws were enacted 
at the urging of patient advocates, who were concerned that 
physicians were not regularly providing patients with important 
information. For example, laws requiring physicians to inform breast 
cancer patients about the availability of breast-conserving treatment 
options were enacted “at the behest of former breast cancer patients,” 
many of whom believed that mastectomies were being overused.310 
Laws requiring physicians to tell women if mammogram results reveal 
the presence of “dense breast tissue” were enacted based on the 
urging of advocates “outraged at the thought of women having yearly 
mammograms without knowing that their dense breast tissue could 
obscure cancerous tumors.”311 The most recent wave of mandatory 
disclosure laws, requiring physicians to offer terminally ill patients the 
option of receiving information and counseling about palliative care 
and end-of-life decision-making, were the result of advocacy by 
terminally ill patients and their families.312 
In contrast to the support for these laws among many patient 
advocates, mandatory disclosure laws have been met with strong 
opposition from the medical profession. For example, when 
Massachusetts’s breast cancer treatment disclosure law was enacted, 
the Massachusetts Medical Society sought to have the statute 
repealed on the ground that it interfered with the patient-physician 
relationship.313 Similarly, state medical societies objected to the 
passage of laws requiring disclosure of end-of-life alternatives.314 
After New York’s Palliative Care Information Act was enacted, an 
 
 309. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6. 
 310. Andersen-Watts, supra note 5, at 203. 
 311. Alena Allen, Dense Women, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 855–56 (2015). 
 312. See Jane E. Brody, Frank Talk About Care at Life’s End, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 
2010, at D1 (noting that New York’s Palliative Care Information Act was enacted at the 
urging of the advocacy group Compassion and Choices of New York). 
 313. Susan G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer 
Treatment Alternatives, 86 NAT’L CANCER INST. J. 1202, 1206 (1994). 
 314. Jane E. Brody, Law on End-of-Life Care Rankles Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2011, at D7 (noting that New York’s law was “[v]ehemently opposed by the Medical 
Society of the State of New York”); see also Steven E. Weinberger et al., Legislative 
Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 
(2012) (opposing, on behalf of several medical associations, “[l]aws that specifically dictate 
or limit what physicians discuss during health care encounters”). 
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oncologist and geriatrician published an editorial in the New England 
Journal of Medicine expressing their sympathy with the law’s overall 
objectives but criticizing its effort “to prescribe legislatively what 
should be a subtle, intimate conversation between doctor and patient 
that often happens over time.”315 
Despite the opposition to these laws among members of the 
professional community, however, it would be difficult to conclude 
that they are not reasonably related to the state’s interest in 
upholding professional quality. Requiring physicians to disclose the 
results of medical testing, as in the breast density legislation, or the 
available treatment alternatives, as in the breast cancer treatment and 
end-of-life care laws, is well within the parameters of standard 
informed consent doctrine. Unlike most of the informed consent laws 
in the context of abortion, these statutes require disclosure of 
factually accurate, relevant information that reasonable patients 
might genuinely want to receive. 
Some commentators have argued that mandatory disclosure laws 
actually undermine patients’ autonomy because, while they might 
appear to be factual, they subtly push patients toward certain 
legislatively preferred decisions. For example, Rachael Andersen-
Watts has described breast cancer disclosure laws as “morally 
coercive tool[s]” that “stem in part from the assumption that 
individual women were making an ‘incorrect’ decision when they 
chose mastectomy instead of lumpectomy.”316 Similarly, Alena Allen 
has criticized the state-prescribed information in some states’ breast 
density disclosure laws for “direct[ing] women to ‘use’ the 
information provided about dense breast tissue to ‘ask’ [their] doctor 
if more screening tests might be useful.”317 By “predetermining for 
women how they should use information about dense breast tissue,” 
she argues, these statutes “substitut[e] the judgment of legislators for 
the judgment of women.”318 Allen also raises the concern that these 
statutes could lead to an overuse of supplemental follow-up 
screenings in contravention of evidence-based medical guidelines.319 
Even accepting the validity of these criticisms, however, they do 
not make the statutes unconstitutional under the standard proposed 
 
 315. Alan B. Astrow & Beth Popp, The Palliative Care Information Act in Real Life, 
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1885 (2011). 
 316. Andersen-Watts, supra note 5, at 203–04. 
 317. Allen, supra note 311, at 874–75. 
 318. Id. at 875. 
 319. Id. at 892. 
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in this Article.320 While it would be problematic if the statutes 
required physicians to recommend particular medical options to 
patients regardless of their own medical judgment, none of the 
statutes do that. The breast cancer treatment laws simply require 
physicians to inform patients that breast-conserving treatments are 
among the available options, without stating that these treatments are 
necessarily preferable in the patient’s situation. While the breast 
density notification laws do imply that supplemental screening might 
be appropriate in some situations, they ultimately direct patients to 
engage in a discussion with their physicians. As part of this discussion, 
physicians can explain that prevailing medical guidelines do not 
endorse additional screening for women with dense breast tissue in 
the absence of other risk factors.321 Because these statutes do not seek 
to override the physician’s individualized medical judgment, they are 
consistent with the state’s interest in upholding professional quality—
even if professional associations do not necessarily agree. 
That being said, the fact that these statutes are probably 
constitutional does not mean that they are wise from a policy 
perspective. It is understandable that legislators would want to 
respond to concerns that patients are being asked to make important 
medical decisions without a full appreciation of the issues, but 
requiring physicians to provide patients with “an additional page in 
the hefty pile of papers foisted on patients”322 is unlikely to be helpful. 
Research has shown that “even when doctors lavish information on 
patients, most patients neither understand nor remember it.”323 
Moreover, no matter how well the required disclosures are initially 
drafted, they can easily become outdated as medical knowledge 
evolves. A better approach would be to encourage the greater use of 
interactive “patient decision aids,” which are tools designed not only 
to provide information but to help patients sort through the available 
options in light of their personal values and goals.324 Rather than 
 
 320. To be clear, neither Andersen-Watts nor Allen suggests that the mandatory 
disclosure laws are unconstitutional; their arguments are grounded in policy concerns, not 
constitutional law. In fact, Allen concludes that “the constitutionality of the density 
notification provisions cannot seriously be doubted.” Id. at 891 (“Casey affirmed the 
state’s authority to regulate the content of physician-patient communications under the 
state’s licensing authority.”). 
 321. See id. at 892. 
 322. Astrow & Popp, supra note 315, at 1886. 
 323. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 668 (2011). 
 324. According to a Cochrane systematic review, decision aids are “interventions 
designed to help people make specific and deliberate choices among options (including the 
status quo), by making the decision explicit and by providing (at the minimum) 
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continuing to enact mandatory disclosure laws, legislatures concerned 
about promoting more informed patient decision-making should 
consider measures to support the integration of these decision aids 
into clinical care.325 
CONCLUSION 
Laws that restrict or compel physician speech pose special 
challenges for the First Amendment because they implicate two 
potentially competing considerations. On the one hand, inappropriate 
government interference in physician-patient communications can 
distort professional practice by preventing physicians from providing 
or soliciting information important to patients’ medical care. On the 
other hand, because patients typically lack the knowledge necessary 
to independently evaluate the quality of professional practice, the 
public relies on the government to ensure that practitioners uphold 
professional norms. To fulfill this mission, the government necessarily 
must make judgments about the opinions and advice that physicians 
express. 
To account for both of these considerations, this Article calls on 
courts to subject restrictions on physician-patient communications to 
a uniform standard of intermediate scrutiny, with a specific focus on 
whether the restrictions directly advance the state’s interest in 
upholding the quality of professional practice. This approach is 
rigorous enough to protect physicians’ and patients’ interest in open 
communication without being so demanding that it precludes 
legitimate regulatory efforts to uphold professional quality. The 
proposed uniform standard would bring clarity to an area of law that 
has been marked by considerable confusion, without introducing the 
 
information on the options and outcomes relevant to a person’s health status as well as 
implicit methods to clarify values.” DAWN STACEY ET AL., DECISION AIDS FOR PEOPLE 
FACING HEALTH TREATMENT OR SCREENING DECISIONS (REVIEW) 8 (Cochrane 
Consumers & Commc’n Grp. ed., 2017). The review notes that decision aids may include  
information on the disease/condition; costs associated with options; probabilities 
of outcomes tailored to personal health risk factors; an explicit values clarification 
exercise; information on others’ opinions; a personalized recommendation on the 
basis of clinical characteristics and expressed preferences; and guidance or 
coaching in the steps of making and communicating decisions with others. 
Id. at 11. 
 325. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision Aids: Solving 
Persistent Problems with Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12 (2017) (calling 
for efforts to incentivize the use of patient decision aids, including the creation of 
independent certification or credentialing processes). 
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practical and theoretical problems raised by proposals for variable 
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